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1 Objectives of the document 
1.1 Objective 
The objective of this document is to provide an initial conceptual framework for 
the project CONSOLE. The initial framework aims at providing a basis for 
interpretation of the project activities, hence connecting project objectives, 
approach and the state of the art about the topic. 
In order to achieve this objective, this initial version of the framework takes mainly 
the approach of an organized broad literature review in support of the project 
expected activities. It also aims at identifying the relevant definitions and scope 
for the project. Finally and foremost, it investigates the tentative logic of a 
preliminary conceptual framework to be further developed into an operational 
framework in the following tasks of WP1 (and of the project as a whole). 
In order to meet these tasks, the literature considered is not restricted to the 
specific contract types addressed by the project (see below), but rather 
attempts to contextualise these contract types in the wider literature on agri-
environmental-climate public goods (AECPGs) provision by agriculture and 
forestry. In doing so, we acknowledge the wide variety of hybrid and mixed 
solutions that may be relevant in practice. 
In addition, we have tried to review specifically the most recent scientific 
literature, including the most debated issues; some classical concepts that are 
well established in the literature may be neglected or under-represented here. 
This document reflects activities carried out in task 1.1 of the project: 
Task 1.1 Initial conceptual framework (M1-M3) 
Leader: UNIBO; Contributors: ALL 
In this task, an initial conceptual framework will be set up based on desk work 
and it will be operationalised to form the basis for the contractual framework to 
be developed in next steps of WP1 and for the other WPs in the project, especially 
in WP2. The conceptual framework will bring together different aspects of 
contract solutions, drivers, farm and context variables highlighting the interplay 
among them. It will also tentatively identify dimensions/parameters in contract 
design and potential assessment criteria (such as longevity, acceptability, legal 
and technological aspects – see section 1.3) and indicators for evaluation, to be 
further investigated in the next steps.” 
The task is expected to yield a deliverable: 
D1.1 Conceptual framework (M3) - Report illustrating the developed conceptual 
framework and its components, features, references, including structuring 
conclusions for the next steps (T1.1). 
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This deliverable was initially due in month 3. While a first version of the document 
was actually ready on time, the submission has been delayed and the document 
used as a living document to collect decisions taken until the set-up of WP2 and 
the third project meeting (month 11) in order to accompany the identification of 
innovative solutions for further steps in the project. It has then been finalised by 
month 13. 
 
1.2 Why develop a single comprehensive framework 
The CONSOLE strategy is to analyse the different (aspects of) contractual options 
for the lasting delivery of agri-environmental-climate public goods (AECPGs) by 
EU agriculture and forestry, using approaches from different disciplinary fields in 
combination and within the same framework. Their integration is being pursued 
through the development of the unified conceptual framework developed at 
the beginning of the project and tested/improved throughout, and by 
continuous interaction with a wide range of stakeholders in an actor-led policy 
support/development process. By the end of the project, it is expected to 
achieve the transformation of the initial framework into an effective operational 
tool able to support decision making in AECPGs contract solutions. 
There are at least three meanings of “single comprehensive” framework here. 
The first one concerns the fact that we address different contract types and want 
to analyse all of them under the same framework. The main reason motivating 
the development of a unified framework in that respect is that the contract 
“types” addressed by the project (see next chapter) are attached to individual 
contract features that can be used not only as alternatives but also in 
combination, considering in addition a wide range of intermediate options. For 
example, some scholars suggest implementing combined (uniform+results-
related) payment schemes depending on uncertainty levels and degree of 
information asymmetry (Derissen and Quaas, 2013). Another example is land 
tenure systems that, besides being a potential instrument for direct AECPGs 
provision, may be regarded as a determinant of longevity (linked to incentive 
and income for landowners/tenants with and without AECPGs 
practices/payments). Also result-based solutions can be applied to collective 
contracts or value chain solutions. 
Second, there are sector-dependent issues at stake, while we want a framework 
potentially working across different sectors and steps in the value chain. While 
the focus is mainly on agriculture, we also extend our scope to the provision of 
AECPGs in forestry. Activities at the interface between agriculture and forestry, 
including measures affecting water courses and forest edges are considered in 
principle. Besides primary production sectors, the framework needs to consider 
downstream actors until final consumers. In addition, interaction among different 
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policy fields, e.g. agriculture and water policy, will have a major role in 
understanding the working and effectiveness of contract solutions. 
Finally, there are a number of disciplines involved, with different conceptual 
starting points (and definition issues-see below form more); the idea here is to sue 
insights from different disciplinary fields and to use them to contribute to the same 
consistent framework, in order to support inter and trans-disciplinary research. 
 
1.3 Outline 
As this document is the starting point to develop the contents of the task but also 
of CONSOLE in general, the next section will report key objective and approach 
of the project, also aimed to justify the identification of the framework. Section 3 
will illustrate the general framework logic. Section 4 will get into the details of the 
framework components. Section 5 discusses methods to analyse contract 
solutions and to support implementation, with a special emphasis on 
stakeholders’ participation. Section 6 will conclude with the work ahead. 
 
2 Project objectives and approach 
2.1 Objectives 
The CONSOLE project focuses on promoting the delivery of (AECPGs) by 
agriculture and forestry through the development of improved contractual 
solutions (mainly intended as contracts between farmers/foresters and other 
parties with provisions for the production of public goods; see below for 
clarifications and definitions). The (difficulty in the) provision of public goods is 
related to major challenges such as trade-offs between environmental 
performance and farm profitability, the time lag between changes in practices 
and impact, and the potential mismatch between the scales of actions and 
effects (Ekroos et al., 2014) as well as to the nature of public goods whereby the 
non-excludability and non-rivalry characteristics prevent the market from 
working for these goods. As a result, several AECPGs, such as water, air and soil 
quality, control of soil erosion, carbon sequestration, animal and plant 
biodiversity and space for recreation are characterised by under-provision. 
Agricultural policy in the EU has partially re-oriented its objective towards the 
provision of public goods in rural areas acknowledging today’s societal demands 
(Erjavec and Erjavec, 2015). In the legislative proposal for the next CAP 
programming period it is foreseen to pursue this path further. The recent Green 
New Deal by the European Commission, and follow up initiatives (e.g., Farm to 
Fork strategy and Biodiversity strategy) tend to strengthen and to qualify this 
orientation. 
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While there is already a large literature (e.g., Cooper et al., 2009; Jones, Silcock 
and Uetake, 2015) and long experience in the EU with Agri-Environmental 
Schemes (AES), the actions aimed at the delivery of AECPGs are still considered 
unsatisfactory in terms of longevity, effectiveness and efficiency, e.g., see 
European Court of Auditors (2011). Improvements may come from a flexible mix 
of promising new instruments (Herzon et al., 2018), such as new environmental-
related tenure systems (e.g. environmental lease), result-based payments or 
collective approaches, as well as by better value chain strategies, but these 
have been so far poorly tested in practice in the EU (Schilizzi and Latacz-
Lohmann, 2016). An effective implementation of these solutions requires a 
consistent multi-level contractual framework accounting for surrounding context 
variables, such as jointness with market goods, price systems, business networks, 
social capital, quality of extension services, farmers’ attitude and expertise and 
EU/national/local framework legislation. Dessart et al. (2019) classified 
behavioural factors that influence farmers’ decisions to adopt environmentally 
sustainable practices into three clusters: dispositional factors, social factors, and 
cognitive factors. The contractual framework also needs to account for social 
(e.g. multi stakeholder projects in some territories), organisational and 
technological innovation processes, as well as for the local and global 
specificities of desired outcomes.  Finally, feasibility may depend on wider 
implications of different approaches, e.g. green box conformity of WTO, 
budgetary constraints and policy coherences within the different environmental 
regulations and the CAP. Concerning contract options and their relationships 
with these context variables, a huge amount of literature exists, mainly at 
national/local level, in particular for those schemes that have been financed 
through the CAP (i.e., reduction of CO2 emissions), but not only. In addition, there 
is a lot of “hidden” knowledge from sparsely distributed local experience in the 
EU and outside. However, this knowledge is not systematically available and 
largely unable to contribute to the improvement of AECPGs-related contracts 
and initiatives. A comprehensive, innovative and collaborative approach to the 
topic (both in research and practice) is needed to ensure a systematic upgrade 
of AECPGs provision in the European Union. 
The general objective of CONSOLE is to boost innovation in the lasting delivery of 
AECPGs by EU agriculture and forestry, by building a Community of Practice 
(CoP), by designing and testing effective and efficient cooperation models and 
by developing a contractual framework supporting implementation by multiple 
actors. The main expected outcome of the project is a framework to better 
design and implement AECPGs contracts, built together with a CoP able to 
apply the framework in a real-life context (see section 2.3 below). The CoP will 
be at the heart of the development of the contractual framework and at the 
core of the CONSOLE impact strategy, involving, among others, the main 
typologies of potential end-users. The CONSOLE CoP involves different groups of 
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local actors (local CoPs in some cases) connected to AECPGs provision initiatives 
in selected case study areas, as well as a pan-European network of practice, 
intended to knowledge creation and mutual learning through mainly virtual 
contacts. Examples of participants include public administrations, rural 
development agencies, farmers and farmers’ organisations, landowners, 
chambers of commerce, local NGOs, consumers, citizens’/residents’ 
associations, both, from and outside the CONSOLE consortium. 
Specific objectives (from DoA) are to: 
obj. 1 “Develop  an  operational  contractual  framework  which  would  serve  the 
development of improved and new contracts, accompanied by solutions tailored to 





obj. 3 Develop  understanding  of  the  acceptability  and  ease  of  implementation  of 
innovative contract solutions through surveys involving a wide range of farmers, rural 
landowners and other key contract actors in 12 EU Member States; 
obj. 4 Assess  the  economic,  social  and  environmental  performance  of  new  and 
innovative  contract  design  options  by  in‐depth  empirical  exploration  and  model 
simulation; 
obj. 5 Build  a  CoP  with  practitioners  and  actors  involved  and  interested  in  AECPG 
provision to facilitate co‐constructing, testing and implementation of new solutions, 
as well as contributing to impacts through participatory co‐training; 
obj. 6 Making  CONSOLE  results  operative  and  easily  accessible  for  a  wide  target 
audience  of  interested  actors  and  stakeholders  (farmers,  farm  advisors, 
administration,  business  along  value  chains,  NGOs,  etc.),  hence  contributing  to  a 
major transition in the way AECPGs are delivered in Europe.” 
 
2.2 Concept and approach 
The topic addressed by CONSOLE implies the multi-, inter- and trans-disciplinary 
understanding of very detailed contract mechanisms in the context of much 
wider issues such as environmental situation and local ecosystems, market forces, 
prices scenarios and variability, value chain strategies, institutional setting, social 
capital, legal context, available technologies.  
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This also requires a transdisciplinary (stakeholders-led) and multi-scale/multilayer 
(accounting for different levels of geographical/administrative aggregation) 
strategy. The unifying logic of CONSOLE is that of a multi-actor learning process 
benefiting from knowledge generated synergistically by different conceptual 
and disciplinary research and operational perspectives. The CONSOLE project 
will boost innovation in contract solutions to promote the delivery of AECPGs 
through a co-constructed process running analogously with the steps of the 
classical policy cycle with the help of knowledge building and learning processes 
activated in the context of a CoP environment (see Figure 1). Considering 
available conceptual references, the process starts with a comprehensive 
diagnostic of success and failure reasons of existing experiences, benefiting of 
an intense dialogue with actors involved in promising national and regional 
initiatives. Based on this, CONSOLE will build up improved contract solutions for 
the future that will be checked for feasibility by farmers and other stakeholders 
and evaluated through simulations. Resulting contractual models and good 
practice guidance will be tested in interaction with members of the CoP and 
showcased for the use by a wide audience of stakeholders and potential end-
users. 
 
2.3 Expected contents of the final framework 
According to DoA, the final version of the framework will include the following: 
a) a catalogue showcasing existing successful experiences and good practices 
in AECPGs contracting based on the case studies developed in WP2 and 
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presented in a usable form as examples for practitioners including hints for 
replication; 
b) improved AECPGs contract solutions suitable to be used as models for future 
design, including their assessment and the role of different levels of governance 
(from local to EU) and implementation; 
c) a “design guide” intended as a systematic comprehensive process for the 
design of AECPG contracts, including the conceptual framework, design 
variables, determinants, legal and technological aspects and roles of different 
governance levels in implementation; 
d) documentation, training and supporting materials. 
The structure and actual contents will be revised and co-designed with 
stakeholders and actors involved in the project. 
 
2.4 Scope and definitions 
This section summarises some definitions and topics related to the purposes of 
CONSOLE. A systematic collection of definition and glossary will be developed in 
the next steps of the project. 
2.4.1 Contractual nature 
A contract can be defined as: “A written or spoken agreement, especially one 
concerning employment, sales, or tenancy, that is intended to be enforceable 
by law” (Oxford Dictionary). 
A contract is an instrument designed by a proponent to delegate a task to an 
agent (or a group of agents) with private information. Its functioning and effects 
are linked to a number of features including risk sharing and transaction costs. 
It is important to make a distinction between administrative acts and contracts 
under public law. 
Instruments for the production of public goods can be classified in different ways. 
A classical distinction is between Command and control regulation, economic 
instruments, information-based instruments. For our purposes, an important 
distinction is between: 




Mandatory measures in some cases can be interpreted using contract 
categories (e.g. in terms of compliance); however, the scope of the project 
includes only VOLUNTARY measures. 
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Besides this broad definition, the project addresses actions related to the 
provision of public goods using contract-based categories and conceptual 
interpretations (e.g. from the economics of contracts), but it is not bound to 
consider only what is legally considered as a contract. E.g. Some CAP payment 
that may not be seen as a contract in legal terms may be considered here if 
compatible with the scope of the project. 
In the context of this broad scope, the project addresses a wide range of 
contract types, not only from EU co-financed schemes, but also from private-
public (e.g. with local administration for compensation measures carried out by 
farmers for infrastructure) and private-private schemes (e.g. cooperation with 
honey producers, green corridors for hunting beneficial for farmland birds), 
commodity contracts with processors/food industry with sustainability 
requirements. The project will also explore the transferability of contracts used in 
non-EU countries. 
 
2.4.2 Solution (Contract) types 
The scope of the project in delimited by solutions for the provision of AECPGs that 
respond to the four features identified in the topic (land-tenure-related, 
collective, result-based, value chain) irrespective of whether they are proper 
contracts. 
In section 4 we elaborate on the notion of contract type after a better discussion 
of the literature and of the framework. 
This broad identification of contract types to be investigated in CONSOLE applies 
to the whole project, but is only partially used to discriminate cases used for 
factsheets in WP2; indeed, cases for first level analysis in task 2.2 may include 
exceptions on the above as long as they may be interpreted as providing useful 
lessons learned for the future investigation of the categories of solutions 
mentioned above. 
 
2.4.3 Case study 
In the CONSOLE project, a case study is intended as a case of real 
implementation of a specific contract solution (limited to contracts consistent 
with the scope above) in an area or region. It can involve several participating 
actors and farms, and several individual cases of implementation of the same 
contract; for the purposes of covering failures, it can also include real life 
proposals of contract solutions that for some reasons have never arrived at the 
stage of generating impact, but that can provide insights from their story, e.g. 
measures that opened calls without participation; contract proposals with no 
uptake, etc. 
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This concept is used in particular in WP2, that works ex-post on the diagnostics of 
existing solutions. 
 
3 The general version of the initial conceptual framework 
 




The proposed framework is intended to study how the contract solutions 
available for AECPG provision interact with the context and produce effects. The 
idea works in a cyclical way resembling the process depicted in Figure 1, but 
highlighting the causal chain from factors behind contract design to its impact 
and then leading to the next round of contract design. Around this cycle, the 
main relevant categories of the system are highlighted in the four boxes. 
On the left-hand side, the loop starts with context variables (related to 
agriculture, food and forestry systems (or, more widely, bioeconomy systems) 
determining processes that allow and shape the definition of contract solutions. 
In turn, contract solutions lead to impact on the systems themselves. The way 
contract solutions affect the system may be described through processes, mostly 
related to human or environment/ecosystem behaviour. The overall effect can 
be measured thorough environmental/ecosystem improvements over time and 
can be related to contract features to evaluate their performances. Hence 
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performance somehow connect the other three dimensions, and can be used 
as a way to assess different contract solutions (in context).  
The context features are described by a number of variables. These variables 





 They  are  affected  by  the  contract  solutions  and  hence  their  change  can  be  used  to 
measure impact (e.g. nutrient load will change due to contract solutions implemented). 
This will be detailed in section 4.1. 
AECPG contract features are a product of the system they are embedded in. 
Contracts are defined/qualified by a set of different features that can be 
presented in different combinations and variants. For the purposes of CONSOLE, 
these features and their interactions allow to identify the main contract types 
studied in the project (land-tenure related provisions, collective, result-based, 
value chain). They are better detailed in section 4.2. 
The interactions and hence the functioning of the contracts can be interpreted 
through conceptual and practical categories used to describe the processes 
leading to impact. Different disciplines have highlighted these processes from 
different perspectives, e.g. incentive structure in economics, impact pathway in 
ecology, preferences and behaviour in economics and social sciences, etc. This 
will be detailed in section 4.3. 
Finally, the performances of the process can be evaluated. This requires an 
understanding of impacts and appropriate impact parameters. However, the 
evaluation of the solutions goes beyond impact/effectiveness measurement, ad 
implies connecting the impact with the design parameters (contract features 
and resources). For example, cost effectiveness may be assessed by linking 
impact to the cost of the contract solution, which is linked to some contract 
feature. Also, some procedural issues, e.g. transaction costs, may be used as a 
component of the measure of performance. This will be detailed in section 4.4. 
Though the “separation” among these blocks is somehow artificial, it allows to 
put emphasis on contract features as the focal point of the project and the 
operational issues related to their design, impacts and evaluation. It also allows 
to highlight the main areas of attention for decisions-makers willing to set up 
contract solutions for AECPG production, i.e. context (state and flow variables) 
and its changes (impacts), contracts, processes, performances. 
In order to avoid confusion, it should be kept in mind that some “items” (terms) 
could be in more than one block (box in the figure), but playing a different role. 
For example, farmers could be everywhere: they are part of the system, they may 
enter as parties in the contract, their behaviour describes the processes and their 
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final changes in practices or income contribute to measure impact. The aspects 
highlighted are however different in each of the boxes. 
All elements listed below are coming from a preliminary literature review, past 
experience and contributions by partners; they are a starting material for the 
setting up of the framework during the project’s life. 
 
4 Framework components and interactions 
 
4.1 Context features/determinants/state variables 
4.1.1 Introduction 
This section describes the variables used to describe the context and to measure 
impacts, through their change over time and space. They interact with contract 
features in determining their feasibility and impact. In a way, this is the most 
significant component of the framework. The scope of these variables may be 
very wide, as the concept of context may be connected to a very wide set of 
features, ranging from locally-specific topics to global issues and worldwide 
phenomena, such as market trends and climate change. However, most of them 
are intended as being represented by some features of the bioeconomy system 
(intended as the aggregate of sectors using biological resources plus related 
natural resources themselves, in particular biological resources and resources 
connected to life such as water). 
Also, the categories included here may include state variables, flow variables 
(e.g., ecosystem services) and changes in state or flow variables over time (and 
derived trends). 
 
4.1.2 State of environment, ecosystems and public goods  
The typology of public goods produced in the reference area is a key element 
for interpreting the potential role of contract features, as they determine policy 
priorities. All features and ecosystem services are potentially relevant here, 
however not all components of the environment and ecosystem services are PG. 
Several lists of public goods are available from the literature. Consistently with the 
project scope, we focus on environmental-climate public goods, thus specifically 
addressing the natural resources water, air and soil as well as biodiversity plus 
measures of climate conditions. In addition, landscape and its use are looked at. 
A list of agricultural and forestry-related PGs, available from the PROVIDE project, 
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Note that some of these may also have the role of object of the contract (see 
4.2). 
Besides the typology of PGs, also other features may be important; in particular: 
 functional relationships, e.g. thresholds, cross‐PG relationships, etc.; 




 scale of provision and  scale of demand;  the  two  scales might not  coincide;  an usual 
distinction is Local vs. global PGs; 
 point vs. non‐point  sources, usually used  to qualify pollution‐related public goods or 
bads. 
 
4.1.3 Agricultural, forestry, food production components 
A number of characteristics are used to describe the sectors/industry involved, 
intended as the system of enterprises and their organization. 






may  provide  incentives  for  the  provision  of  public  goods  besides  marketing  and 
communication with consumers; 
 other bioeconomy sectors  (e.g. biofuels, biorefineries plants, bio‐based value chains) 
may  be  strong  determinant  of  incentives  at  the  farm  level  by  affecting  the  farmers 
opportunity  costs  and directly  involved  in  the provision of public  goods  (e.g. CO2 or 
renewable energies). 
For each of these categories (separately and together), in order to support an 
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Macro categories qualifying the production systems as a whole may allow a 
better overall understanding of the incentive system and potentialities, as well as 
of the degree of the elaboration of collective solutions, hence finally the 
plausible approaches in each area. 
A relevant example is the list below, slightly adapted from the classification used 
in the H2020 PROVIDE project (Viaggi, 2014): 
 intensive agricultural areas (high trade‐offs with public goods); 
 areas  characterized  by  tourism  opportunities  or  linked  to  urban  areas  (high 
opportunities linked to recreation etc.); 






Historical trends and trajectories of system evolution matter and are worthy of 
consideration, in order to identify reasons for the current state of play and also 
better understand dynamic phenomena, like transition and path dependency. 
 
4.1.4 Technology 
Technology refers to the broad set of technologies available in the system in and 
by which the contract is implemented. The stock of available technologies 
determines production possibilities, trade-offs between private and PGs, 
production costs and profitability; this also includes information technology 
suitable to reduce input use (precision farming, satellites, etc.), or to manage 
transactions, or to monitor results and the environment itself. 
From the point of view of CONSOLE, technology is relevant under three main 
aspects: 
 the set of potential technologies/practices that can be proposed/adopted to increasing 
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The CONSOLE project is especially concerned with the second point, as long as 
new technology options can also be key to determine the feasibility of some type 
of contracts, in particular result-based or collective. The implementation of these 
solutions is indeed typically limited by the ability to monitor results. More generally, 
this can support coordination among actors and communication connected to 
contract implementation. In addition, through interoperability and in some cases 
big data exploitation, connection between land use, recorded practice and 
results can be achieved. This has implications also for contract design, e.g. level 
and distribution of transaction costs, sanction systems, etc. The third point can 
also be key in several contexts. 
The combination of points 2 and 3 can also bring completely new ways in 
producing information and assess measures. A case is that of crowdsourcing 
databases. As another example, Rosário et al. (2019) illustrates Geocaching, an 
outdoor game that uses Global Positioning System (GPS) for assessing values and 
ES indicators. In general, smartphone technologies are expected to open the 
way not only to smoother communication, but also to a more active role of 
farmers monitoring and contract management. 
Some of the topics above point to the general issue of Big data, which are 
expected to have an important role in sustainability, but their potential is still 
largely unexploited and difficult to grasp (Weersink et al., 2018). 
 
4.1.5 Policy conditions1 
Under policy conditions we include mainly public policies acting on the 
bioeconomy and resources system mainly through regulation and incentives. This 
includes specifically provision of incentives to the adoption of AECPGs contract 
solutions, consistent with the contract types in the focus of the project. Many 
policy measures can be interpreted as well through contract categories.  
Connection with policy includes in particular connection with the CAP, in 
particular in relation to integration of environmental requirements (but see full 
policy coverage in the project) and supports the policy-related exploitation of 
CONSOLE results. The EU has already envisioned the use of collective measures 
in the first and second (AECPGs schemes) pillar and provided the possibility for 
result-based approaches. 
                                                
1 Policy and legal conditions could be described under the same chapter as they are often connected to each other; 
given the focus of the project, we keep them separated. 
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Besides individual policies, also the policy mix and the combined working of 
different policy measures is important. In particular, the evolution of the policy 
mix and environmental regulation within the CAP (i.e. cross-compliance-; 
greening and AES) is important. Within this, we will keep a focus on post 2020 CAP 
reforms. 
The wider policy context (again connected to the legal aspects) also includes 
policy principle and affects the definition of property rights. An example is the 
threshold between polluter pays principle (PPP) (cross-compliance) and provider 
gets principle (AESs), which in fact affects the definition of Public Goods vs. Public 
“Bads”. 
In the timeframe of the project, policy demands coming from the European 
Green Deal and by the related Farm to Fork and biodiversity strategy will be of 
particular relevance for the project, as well as the delayed process of CAP reform 
and the preparation of the National Strategic Plans. 
The ongoing discussion about CAP implementation as well as the Green Deal 
and the related Farm to fork and biodiversity strategies have been released 
towards the end of the preparation of this document and will be the key policy 
references for the next steps of the project. 
 
4.1.6 Legal conditions 
We consider here any type of legal frameworks that can affect contract working 
and that can in particular affect AECPGs provision. It concerns in particular the 
legal bases of agriculture and environmental policy. Legal conditions are 
especially relevant to identify the feasibility of innovative solutions, e.g. to what 
extent result-based payments are consistent with the current legislation, or which 
legal changes need to be made. Legal thinking is becoming urgent under the 
application of payments for environmental services (Langlais, 2019). Further key 
areas of concern are WTO and competition laws, and land tenure regulation 
(national and local). 
The contribution of the legal reflection for CONSOLE is organized around three 
points: 
- the identification and in-depth analysis of the different forms of individual 
contracts likely to provide environmental goods and services. This typology of the 
contracts to be studied within the project is to be carried out with reference to 
the contracts identified as key for CONSOLE, having regard also to the expected 
contractual characteristics (duration of contract, for example). This should make 
it possible not only to analyse the legal feasibility of the contractual proposals 
made, but also to make suggestions for improvements so as to meet the various 
desired requirements.  
- the different legal models for collective supply of environmental goods and 
services, whether in a vertical form (along value chains) or a horizontal form (such 
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as agricultural producer groups offering their environmental goods and services 
together in order to, for example, combat flooding at a landscape level).  
- in addition to such formal contracts, there will be exploration of the surrounding 
legal framework which must effectively be analysed in order to assess contracts, 
tools widely used in environmental law and therefore the contract law 
associated with it here, the various forms of law useful for analysing the feasibility 
and improvement of CONSOLE's contractual solutions. In this context, reference 
will be made to, inter alia: competition law, including state aid; WTO law; public 
procurement law; and, rural law. And it will also be necessary to address this 
framework at the articulation between different levels (international law; 
European Union law; and national law, including regional and local application).  
 
4.1.7 Market situation 
Markets are related to AECPGs provisions and specifically to contracts in different 
ways. 
First, by determining prices of goods, the market situation can affect trade-offs 
and opportunity costs attached to the provision of AECPG, when they imply 
reduction of income. Note that in this interplay not only the market of agricultural 
products, but also the market of agricultural input (e.g., energy, fertilisers, etc.) 
can be very relevant. 
A key role in connection to AECPGs can be played by market of diversification 
activities (i.e. recreation activities, rural development initiatives, among others). 
On the other hand, markets can provide remuneration of AECPGs components 
when there is a positive willingness to pay by consumers for PGs attached to 
private goods. This in practice is also connected to marketing strategies, value 
chain structure, general economic situation of potential consumers (e.g., 
income), potential segmentation options. An important role in this direction may 
be taken by instruments such as standards, labels and certification schemes. 
 
4.1.8 Other actors, institutions, governance 
In this category we include at large other actors than agricultural, forestry, food 
production firms and that interact with the working of the bioeconomy system. 
Farm extension and advice (and the Agricultural Knowledge and Innovation 
system – AKIS - as a whole) are key players as they support farms decision making 
and the costs of change. 
A central role may be played by consumers and by their willingness to pay for 
sustainable production, but any important player in the system may be relevant, 
especially public bodies and connecting institutions, such as NGOs, parks etc. 
The interaction among these players affects directly or indirectly the provision of 
AECPG by agriculture and forestry and the related initiatives (and have a special 
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role in the kind of instruments addressed by the project, e.g. collective measures). 
Their interaction is affected by existing institutional relationships and connections. 
This also allows or hampers the feasibility of contracts and facilitate coordination 
in some cases. 
Other actors of the value chain may have an important role; e.g., input suppliers 
and processors of agricultural products. 
The same applies for a variety of other actors, such as municipalities. 
With respect of the specific initiatives these categories can take the role of actors 
when they are actively involved in the action or as parties in the contract, or 
stakeholders, if they have a stake in it but are not directly active or contractually 
involved. 
Note that, in a circular bioeconomy and ecosystem services vision, the different 
and social components are more and more interconnected and spatially 
related. As a result, besides individual actor groups and features, it is important 
to identify categories to qualify the whole system, much beyond agriculture and 
forestry, such as those proposed by the literature on socio-ecological systems. 
 
4.2 Contractual features 
4.2.1 Introduction 
Contractual features refer to the characteristics that can describe a contract. It 
is well-known that a difficulty with contract analysis is the complexity of potential 
contract design dimensions and how the different contract prescriptions interact 
among themselves and affect the outcome. 
In order to relate the contract features to the scope of the project we identify 
two sets of features: 
a. Features characterising selected AECPG contract typologies: 








Features listed in group a) have been identified in the project (and in the 
literature) as so important as to characterise the functioning of the contract for 
the purposes of policy analysis. For these reasons we use also them in the project 
to identify contract types. However, they are not exclusive, meaning that hybrid 
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forms can exist. Features of group b) can be relevant per se and in combination 
with some of the feature of group a). 
The four contract features mentioned above and illustrated below are not 
mutually exclusive, i.e. they can be included in a contract in combination. So, 
we use the term contract feature to identify an element of the contract and 
contract type for specific combination of these features. One prevailing feature 
may characterise a contract type, e.g. result-based payments. A specific topic 







A review of available studies estimating preferences for different contract 
characteristics is available in appendix 1. 
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4.2.2 Feature used to identify contract types in the project 
4.2.2.1 Tenure-related environmental prescriptions (qualifying also environmental-
related tenure contracts) 
Environmental prescriptions can be related to tenure. These characteristics of 
contracts may in principle include a wide variety of cases. 
Some examples of environmental-related actions connected to land tenure are 
available in the literature. Zabel, Bostedt, and Ekvall (2018) provide an example 
of tax system on forest landowners in Sweden and related design problems. More 
are reported but little studied. For example: leasing by parishes constrained to 
cultivate with organic technology (Austria) and collective lease agreements to 
manage abandoned land (Italy); 
The trade-off between purchasing environmental goods and purchasing land 
has been discussed in the literature for a long time. As a recent example, 
Schöttker and Wätzold (2018) analysed the cost-effectiveness of purchasing land 
vs. compensation for practice adoption, using a case study in a Natura 2000 
conservation area in Schleswig-Holstein.  
The specific characteristic of interest for CONSOLE is that of tenure contracts 
involving also environmental prescriptions; this may involve different 
combinations of private and public actors and be associated or not to incentives 
such as tax reliefs. 
 
 
4.2.2.2 Reference parameter for payment (qualifying some categories of result-based 
approaches) 
Payments to farmers for the provision of AECPGs may be calculated in different 
ways. In general, the payment can be divided into a fixed component and a 
variable component. The latter can take more or less into account the actual 
results (in terms of PG provision) of the actions taken by the farmers. 
Hanley et al. (2012) preferred the contract classification as action-based and 
outcome-based. White and Hanley (2016) further provided a classification of 




3. Asset‐based  contract:  payment  targeted  at  the maintenance  of  an  ecosystem  asset  
(Hart and Moore, 1988; Aghion and Holden, 2011) 
Result-based approaches (also known as payment for outcomes) are payments 
based on performance or output, in contrast to action-, practice- or input-based 
approaches; result-based approaches connect payments to environmental 
effects (Derissen and Quaas, 2013; White and Hanley, 2016; European Network 
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for Rural Development, 2016) or in or terminology, to the amount of AECPGs 
provided. Note however that this may not be exhaustive of result-based 
approaches at large, as result-orientation can be taken into account in different 
ways (e.g. in the application selection process). 
Usually agri-environmental payments in the EU CAP are targeted to 
management actions (input based) typically because these are thought to be 
easier to observe and because environmental outputs are determined by a wide 
range of factors, some of which are not under the direct control of farmers. 
However, there might be the case that some management action is expensive 
to the regulator to observe and/or the regulator might not be aware about the 
best method for investing in the ecosystem asset. Under these circumstances an 
output-based contract might be more cost-effective. 
CONSOLE focuses on the analysis of proper result-based payments, i.e. payment 
based (also) on measurable results originated from farm practices. Output-
based or results oriented are here intended as distinct categories from result-
based. However the consideration of alternative mechanisms either input-based 
or using approximation of results (results oriented or computed results) may be 
relevant both for comparison (Moxey and White, 2014) and because they can 
yield insights about feasible alternatives.  
Action-based AES are considered providing too little impact. Recent evidence 
corroborate this, pushing for higher flexibility (Arnott et al., 2019). In addition, the 
main rationale from the literature for adopting result-based approaches is that 
they are more economically efficient (Reed et al., 2014), including providing 
incentives for farmers to innovate (Burton and Schwarz, 2013) and together with 
a broader scope of effect, such as flexibility, higher intrinsic motivation and 
improved continuous adaptation (Matzdorf and Lorenz, 2010). Advantages of 
payment by results are thoroughly identified and described by Herzon et al. 
(2018). 
However, obstacles and disadvantages are identified such as given below  
(Matzdorf and Lorenz, 2010; Reed et al., 2014): 
 scientific uncertainty and lack of pricing of ecosystem services; 
 timing of payments; 






 dependence  of  the  expected  performances  on  the  behaviour  and  information 
assumptions (see next section). 
Hence, while offering theoretically better performances, these solutions put more 
risk on the participating land managers and hence require a careful design, in 
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particular in case of high uncertainty of the outcome (Matzdorf and Lorenz, 
2010). Strategies are proposed to make the result-based solutions more 
acceptable, such as the combination with insurance schemes (Reed et al., 2014) 
and other options that transfer the risk of not achieving the objectives on e.g. 
investors.  
Various papers address the problem from a theoretical or modelling point of 
view. For example, Drechsler (2017) develops a conceptual model to analyse 
the performance of Input- and Output-based Payments for the Conservation of 
Mobile Species. White and Hanley (2016) model the relative performance of 
result-based payments under asymmetric information. 
A broad review of existing result-based agri-environmental schemes in Europe is 
provided by Burton and Schwarz (2013) focusing on two key 'problem areas': the 
increased risk for farmers and the difficulties of developing and monitoring 
indicators. They also propose a framework to examine the advantages of result-
based approaches, identifying three main dimensions: proportion of the result-
oriented payment; sensitivity of payments, and duration of the schemes (and 
payments). The work also highlights the role of this kind of payments to promote 
cultural/social change and the need to ensure cultural embeddedness. 
Several examples of result-based payments or empirical analysis of hypothetical 
schemes are available in the literature. 
Matzdorf and Lorenz (2010) present the results of 90 interviews with farmers who 
have participated in a result-oriented AEM in Baden-Wuerttemberg (Germany). 
The main finding is a positive impact on cost-effectiveness, but the results also 
highlight that the concrete design and the implementation process play a 
crucial role for their successful application. 
Zabel (2019) reports result-based program for biodiversity on alpine pastures in 
Switzerland. The largest part of the variation of payment levels can be explained 
by livestock density, livestock species composition, property rights, individual 
versus collective management, and social capital. In this case the option to 
provide some payment in advance is also an interesting incentive solution, while 
monitoring and extra payment is provided 8 years later. 
Relevant initiatives are those using “prize” schemes, e.g. prairies fleuries in France. 
Incentives derive by both the payment and the acknowledgement by peers 
(winners are acknowledged at the prestigious agriculture exhibition in Paris of the 
prize by the Agriculture Ministry), the neighbouring farmers meet together with 
technicians to “judge” the best pasture and attribute winner, it is a sort of social 
capital-based scheme (Fleury et al., 2015). 
Palm-Forster, Suter and Messer (2019) reported experiment-based solutions to link 
payments to reduce pollution to water quality, also testing innovative design. 
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Wezel et al. (2018) analysed result-based solutions in the context of mountainous 
farming in different Alpine countries, by carrying out 79 interviews with farmers in 
different case study regions in Germany, France, Austria, Italy, and Switzerland. 
Russi et al. (2016) analysed MEKA-B4, the result-based agri-environment measure 
in place in Baden-Württemberg (Germany) between 2000 and 2014, which 
aimed to preserve species-rich grassland. 
Birge et al. (2017) designed a hypothetical payment-by-results scheme for 
biodiversity conservation on environmental grasslands in Finland, based on 
indicators related to a number of species. Farmers were positive, but the advisors 
brought doubts about the implementability of the scheme and the compatibility 
with the current policy context. 
Schroeder et al. (2013) investigated farmers' acceptance and perception of 
potential 'Payment by Results' (PBR) in grassland. The results show that the 
majority of farmers accepted result-based payments. Acceptance was 
significantly influenced by farmers' age, experience with AES, farm size and 
abundance of pre-existing environmental features. An approach combining 
differentiated options, including payment options with different target levels 
emerged as a possible way forward. 
Various alternative options also do exist to avoid the direct measurement of 
results in a result-oriented approach (Reed et al., 2014), such as the use of 
pressure-response functions and modelling approaches (establishing causal links 
between management and ecosystem service delivery, as well as reducing the 
costs of monitoring). For example, Muenich et al. (2017) developed a PFP system 
that uses a unique application of one of the leading agricultural models, the 
USDA's Soil and Water Assessment Tool, to evaluate the nutrient load reductions 
of potential farm practice changes based on field-level agronomic and 
management data. This support spatial targeting that can be interpreted as a 
result-oriented approach. 
The literature also provides a number of other results-oriented solutions that are, 
in principle, outside the scope of CONSOLE. An example is payment-by-results 
conservation procurement auctions (Groth, 2011). In turn these solutions reveal 
trade-offs compared with non-payment-by result version, e.g. because of higher 
transaction costs (Coggan, Whitten and Bennett, 2010; Palm-Forster et al., 2016). 
Some failed initiatives are also reported (cfr. Task 2.3) where the complexity (and 
cost) to achieve an actual monitoring of results determined the failure of the 
scheme (e.g., In S. America reported by the World Bank  as cited by Schomers 
and Matzdorf, 2013). 
 
4.2.2.3 Role of cooperation among farmers/actors (qualifying collective approaches) 
Interplay among farmers and/or other actors can take different forms. In a broad 
sense, collective approaches are schemes for which the individual rewards 
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depend by design on actions/decisions taken by others or collectively. For 
example, on a similar issue, (Kotchen and Segerson, 2018) define the key feature 
of group approaches as “the creation of regulatory interdependency among 
group members.” The "team production” problem was first addressed by 
Holmstrom (1982). The premium of an agent depends on the production of other 
agents. With team production new moral hazard problem arise (collusion, 
renegotiation). 
Two main elements can be potentially used to qualify collective approaches. 
The first one is a horizontal collective action element, i.e. a group of farmers 
arranges a cooperative agreement in order to deliver environmental public 
goods. The second one is the inclusion of a collective conditionality constraint 
added to a contractual arrangement, i.e. the contracts are between (or is 
activated to) a group of agents, rather than to individuals, to carry out actions in 
order to deliver agri-environmental public goods. The agglomeration bonus is an 
example of this type of mechanisms. The agglomeration bonus is a two-part 
scheme where in additional to a traditional per-hectare payment, a bonus is 
added in case plots of enrolled land are connected to each other (Parkhurst et 
al., 2002; Wätzold and Drechsler, 2014).  
Note that albeit important, ambient mechanisms fall out of the mechanisms 
analysed in CONSOLE as they lack, at least in their original form, a voluntary 
character (Segerson, 1988; Romstad, 2003).  
Actually, within this definition, a major issue is the distinction between cases in 
which individuals are affected by others, but decided individually, and cases in 
which the decision itself is taken collectively. CONSOLE will focus on the latter, 
but we mention first examples of the former, as they can be relevant as 
complementary solutions. The agglomeration bonus provides an example of 
how a contracts solution can fall in either one of the cases depending on how 
on how the mechanisms is specified. 
CONSOLE will focus in particular on collective solutions involving mainly collective 
implementation of practices where different farmers, or farmers and other actors, 
collaborate in producing one or more AECPGs. The key definitory character is 
that a single payment is delivered to a group of farmers (or, less in focus, other 
actors). 
This type of solution is particularly suitable to deal with landscape-scale 
configuration of public goods provision; however, it may involve higher 
coordination costs (Uetake, 2012; Lefebvre et al., 2015; European Network for 
Rural Development, 2016a). 
Various cases of collective solutions are appearing in the literature, also providing 
more generalised insights about their functional features. Westerink et al. (2017) 
reported case studies from five EU member states in North West Europe and 
analyse their collaborative governance arrangements. They investigate the 
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distribution of governance tasks among actors and the changes of this 
distribution over time.  
Groeneveld et al. (2018) used multi-objective modelling to assess collective 
participation in Dutch AES schemes and its impact on biodiversity  
Riley et al. (2018) analysed collective measures in UK, also providing a theoretical 
contribution in linking their working with trust and the concept of good farmer. 
Westerink, Melman and Schrijver (2015) studied the role of scale and self-
governance in agri-environment schemes, considering two alternative 
approaches in the Netherlands using collective solutions. 
Franks and Emery (2013) investigated 18 Environmental Stewardship Scheme 
(ESS) agreements in UK. They found that the number of stakeholders and their 
range of interests (rather than the land area covered by the agreement), are the 
major determinants of transaction costs on large-area agreements. 
Zavalloni, Raggi and Viaggi (2019) theoretically analysed a mechanism that 
rewards farmers in case they cooperate on habitat when biodiversity provides ES 
benefits for the agricultural production.  
Sheremet et al. (2018) considers the problem of designing PES-type contracts to 
encourage participation and spatial coordination amongst private forest owners 
in Finland. 
The consideration of collective/collaborative actions can go beyond collective 
participation of farmers to AES. For example, Pinna (2016) studied the link 
between Alternative Food Networks, agro-biodiversity and landscape protection 
in connection to two rural parks. Initiatives such as Producers Organisation (PO) 
may be examples in this direction, as well as variety of multi-actor initiatives. These 
may provide relevant insights even if in principle outside the scope of CONSOLE. 
 
4.2.2.4 Degree of connection with private goods provision (qualifying value chain 
approaches) 
Production of public goods may have different degrees and types of connection 
with the provision of private goods. In many cases, in addition, ecosystem 
services and climate-related goods are not pure public goods. 
While a lot of research has been devoted to governmental support of AES, much 
less is known about value chain approaches in which consumers of a private 
good also accept to pay for some attached public good. However, a growing 
literature from business studies is investigating new business models and strategies 
to make the supply chains more sustainable by internalizing the added value 
that society demands. These studies describe for example the drivers of 
corporate social responsibility, the creation of shared value across the supply 
chain (Porter and Kramer, 2011) or the development of the inclusive business 
model (Chamberlain and Anseeuw, 2019)(. 
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Key players in this context are industrial food producers and retailers. Results from 
recent studies show that food companies have an interest in the documentation 
of environmental benefits of supplying farms and that this can be used for their 
marketing strategies. They are also willing to provide support through finance and 
appropriate contract design (Kempa, 2013) or through technology and 
knowledge. 
In CONSOLE, value chain approaches will be addressed as an additional 
mechanism and a cross-cutting theme of solutions for valorisation of AECPGs 
through the market. 
 
4.2.3 Other relevant features 
There will be several other features also interacting with the above. We list some 
of most relevant below. 
 
Other payment characteristics 
Besides the way the payment is connected to output and input, also other 
characteristics may be relevant. The most widespread parameter relevant for 
decision making is of course the level of payment. 
In addition, there could be other issues, such as the presence of bonuses and the 
timing of payment delivery (relevant for farm finance). 
 
Enforcement 
Enforcement can take place in different ways, the main distinction being third 
party (the court) vs self-regulation solutions. Self-regulation involves the private 
provision of public goods and private redistribution and takes place outside the 
institutions of government and, hence, in the realm of private rather than public 
policy (Baron, 2010). 
 
Monitoring and sanctions  
The monitoring and sanction system is related to enforcement. Monitoring 
concerns the actions taken to check implementation or effects. The sanction 
system concerns penalties expected in case of non-compliance. 
 
Length of the contract 
Time-horizon (length) is the duration of the contract. Long-term contracts may 
have different environmental effects but also different preferability for famers 
              
 
32 
This project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation 
programme under grant agreement GA 817949 
 
than short-term contracts. For example, barriers to participation may be faced 
by tenant farmers who only have short-term security concerning land availability 
(which may be also an explicit legal requirement). 
The length of the contract also has a relevant implication in term of risk 
behaviour. Ridier (2012) shows that a long-term contract is preferred by risk-
adverse farmers when the decision is affected by high uncertainty (for example, 
on commodities prices).  
Contract incompleteness brings to frequent renegotiation and, consequently, to 
short term contractual cancellation (Fraser, 2002; Fraser, 2012). Drechsler, Johst 
and Wätzold (2017) analyse with a conceptual ecological-economic model how 
the cost-effectiveness of short versus long contract lengths depends on different 
ecological and economic parameters. Moral hazard, targeting and contract 
duration in agri-environmental policy are investigated by Fraser (2012). 
 
Actors/parties involved 
Actors are the parties involved in the contract. This may include (at least two) 
single actors, a group of actors, multilevel actors.  
Scale of the contract, e.g. farm level, landscape level, watershed, region, etc. is 
also important in connection with the parties involved. 
 
Object of contract solution: AECPG type and others 
The object of the contract for our purposes can be mainly defined based on the 
PG intended to be produced. It can be any of those listed in section 4.1. Some 
of them may be excluded from the list here as they are not 
environmental/ecosystem service/climate PG, for example Rural viability and 
vitality and Quality and security of products. 
The AECPG(s) intended to be produced are important as there is a connection 
with the performance and suitability of the different contract types/features 
discussed above. For example, result-based solutions may be more suitable for 
some biodiversity parameters and carbon stocks, but much less (or not at all) for 
diffuse pollution. 
An important point is if contract features concern one single service, multiple 
services or have a holistic (environmental) approach. Only rarely contracts 
include a system approach (e.g. organic production); most often they address 
specific assets, management practices or PGs. 
Besides the general list provided above, also new types of PG are emerging, 
each requiring appropriate instruments for analysis, as well as policy instruments 
(Davies and Hodge, 2006). A recent example is provided by Mato-Amboage, 
Pitchford and Touza (2018) who conceptualise a novel biosecurity (interpreted 
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as an emerging type of public good) instrument relying on formal compensation 
private–public partnerships using contract theory. 
In practice the definition of the PG in the contract specification is much more 
detailed, e.g. water quality may be identified through one or more different 
parameters of quality etc. It can also be qualified in different ways, e.g. as an 
expected change, the respect of a threshold or some other definition. 
In many cases, the contract is defined in terms of technical prescriptions, e.g. on 
pesticides use. Amount/size of the contract can also be important, e.g., the 
amount of land involved.  
 
Information as a part of the scheme/role 
Information and advice may be provided to famers as part of the scheme. 
Information provision may interact with other contract features, for example 
ability to implement collective action (Opdam et al., 2016). 
 
Flexibility 
Flexibility is an important characteristic of the contract. Flexibility may apply to 
several parameters, such as the length of contracts, the selection of measures, 
the prescriptions to be undertaken, the area under contract, etc. 
 
4.2.4 Relationship with payments for ecosystem service (PES) literature 
In the CONSOLE project we do not discriminate if the contract types addressed 
can be classified or not as PES as long as they respond to the characteristics 
described above. The literature and definition debate about PES is already quite 
complex and we do not enter into that debate (Schomers and Matzdorf, 2013; 
Waylen and Martin-Ortega; 2018). This also applies for the different performances 




4.3.1 Conceptual and disciplinary references 
On the disciplinary side, CONSOLE entails an understanding of both individual 
and collective actions, as well as the study of how this translates into 
environmental and/or climate benefits. 
Behavioural aspects may be particularly relevant for the collective 
implementation of environmental conservation practices which requires 
horizontal coordination and action among independent landowners and 
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managers. In addition, monetary incentives (either individual or collective) 
coming from public policy may be not the only mechanism affecting decisions. 
While it is understandable that farmers have little incentive to continue the 
provision of practices related to public goods without payments, due to lack of 
remuneration by the market (Hodge, 2001), the literature also highlights the 
potential of vertical cooperation with AECPGs valorisation through product 
chain strategies and the connection of beneficial AECPGs practices with social 
capital and innovation (Saxby, Gkartzios, and Scott, 2018). The literature also 
suggests that simple monetary assessment of incentives might fail to explain the 
emergence of cooperation (Ostrom, 1990). Institutional consideration, fairness in 
the distribution of benefits and costs, monitoring, transaction costs are all 
elements that become relatively more important when the collective 
implementation of resource conservation is targeted. The degree of interplay in 
these cases is so relevant that, in some cases, not participating by one lead to 
complete failure (lack of implementation) or non-achievement of the initial 
objective. 
CONSOLE covers broadly all the main dimensions of contract design. The 
approach requires understanding of four main aspects: a) mechanisms in their 
stylised form, usually addressed by economic incentives through simple 
behavioural assumptions and formal mathematical analysis or mathematical 
modelling; b) the actors’ (e.g. farmers) expected behaviour in relation to the 
solutions proposed, often addressed through the theory of planned behaviour, 
or more in general, behavioural economics using often experiment-based 
instruments; c) the institutional understanding of arrangements and solutions 
among stakeholders’ interactions, which needs interfacing transaction costs 
economics, socio-ecological systems, legal perspectives and transitions in 
collective actions; d) the impacts on environmental goods and bundles of 
ecosystem services, and their interaction, which requires interfacing with 
sustainability and environmental sciences/landscape ecology. CONSOLE 
proposes a problem-oriented integration of these fields of expertise using a 
combination of selected instruments. Legal aspects (current legal framework 
and needed changes) will have a prominent role in the project in order to ensure 
the feasibility of more effective ways for the delivery of public goods in 
agriculture. Not only the EU legislative framework and WTO rules (“green box”) 
will be addressed, but also national contract law will be looked at (Brink, 2009; 
Bureau, 2017). The link between agricultural policy program and indicators of 
provision of AECPGs needs to be strengthened also through common 
methodological standards and structured databases. A specific emphasis will be 
put on the role of new technology, in connection with result-based payments 
and for involvement in chain valorisation. 
Most of the items listed in the mechanism’s categories are somehow related to 
behaviour and decision making. A holistic framework concerning adoption of 
agro-ecological practice is provided by (Schoonhoven and Runhaar 2018) and 
applied to Andalusia. 
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The most classical economic basis to analyse behaviour is to consider costs and 
benefits of the proposed practices (determined also through the results they 
generate). Costs and benefits for farmers are the most common focus, but the 
whole distribution of costs and benefits including also other actors involved (e.g. 
public administration, chain actors, input providers, etc.) should be taken into 
account. 
Not only total costs, but also cost structure may be very important in AECPGs 
provision. For example, Espinosa-Goded et al. (2013) analysed the role of fixed 
costs in AES adoption. 
The relevance of transaction costs is a general issue in environmental policy 
(Coggan et al., 2010). Specifically private transaction costs on the one hand and 
public transaction costs in the form of administrative costs (Weber, 2014, 2015) 
may be determinant for policy feasibility (European Commission, 2019). 
 
4.3.3 Asymmetric information and contract incompleteness 
A large part of literature related to agri-environmental contracts addresses the 
problem from the perspective of asymmetric information and contract 
incompleteness. 
If there are no informational asymmetries between the members of the group 
and between the group and the proponents of the contract (public and private 
institutions), then the solution to the problem of contract design is trivial. The 
problem becomes more complex when, as in real life, there are asymmetries of 
information or no complete contingent contract can be written.  
With ‘Asymmetric information’ we mean condition in which one party in a 
transaction has relevant information that is not known by or available to the other 
party (Merriam-Webster Unabridge) (Ferraro, 2008). 
Also, problems can arise when contracts are incomplete. “An incomplete 
contract has gaps, missing provisions, and ambiguities and has to be completed 
(by renegotiation or by the courts) with strictly positive probability in some states 
of the world.” (Hart and Moore, 1999). 
A classification of contractual problems under asymmetric information is the 
following (Laffont and Martimort, 2001). 
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 Non‐Verifiability:  The  involved  parties  are  symmetrically  informed  and  observe  the 
state  of  the world,  but  they  cannot  verify  it  to  the  courts.  Therefore,  contracts  are 
incomplete. 
 
In an AECPG contract, it is normally assumed that farmers are better informed 
than the public decision maker about implementation costs and results. Usually 
asymmetric information is one way, but can also be two-ways. Bilateral 
asymmetric information in AES is addressed by Cho and Blandford (2018). 
The information conditions may affect the choice and the design of the 
instrument according to the different parameters listed in the previous section. 
For example, White and Hanley (2016) compare input-based vs. result based 
contracts. They found that under perfect information inputs or outputs-based 
contracts are equivalent. Under asymmetric information with adverse selection, 
input-based contracts are more cost effective in reducing the informational rent 
compared to output-based contracts. Mixed contracts are also cost-effective. 
The paper also analyses contracts under moral hazard, and repeated 
contracting. 
 
4.3.4 Behaviour related to longevity 
Evidence about determinants of temporal patters is still poor. Longevity is a term 
actually used for different situations. 
One is that of continuation of participation to contracts by farmers or foresters. 
Farmers decision to continue in AES is analysed by Gatto, Mozzato and 
Defrancesco (2019). They found that farmers continuation of an agri-
environmental scheme for a long period of time is the outcome of a mix of 
concurring factors, among which attitudes, motivations and social factors. It also 
depends on social pressure and choices of neighbouring farms. Núñez-Regueiro 
et al. (2019) found that PES on better land have shorter lifetime for forestry. 
Another issue is that of longevity intended as the permanence of actions 
producing AECPGs once the payment is over, which is largely related to private 
incentives to maintain the adopted practices/technologies once the 
intervention is finished. 
 
4.3.5 Acceptability 
In general acceptability is the quality of a contract to be satisfactory or to be 
agreed on by potential participants, in particular farmers. This may be 
connected to some contract feature. 
For example, cultural acceptability of result based are analysed by Birge and 
Herzon (2019). They distinguish “four categories of farmers based on their 
integration of ecological results into farming. These are determined by nature 
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values being: 1) central to farmer thinking, 2) well-integrated, 3) viewed 
positively, but with limited actions and, 4) mainly absent.” 
 
4.3.6 Preferences for contract attributes 
Farmers show preference for different (levels of) contract attributes. A collection 
of studies investigating preferences related to different contract attributes 
relevant for AECPGs provision is reported in appendix 1. Preferences may also 
concern some of the contract features used to identify types, e.g. the character 
of being result-based (Wezel et al., 2018). 
 
4.3.7 Other behavioural issues and nudging 
Behaviour research also investigates several other aspects of contract design 
and adoption. 
One emerging topic relate to practice adoption is nudging. Experiments on 
nudging and compliance with water protection rules are investigated by Peth et 
al. (2018). Kuhfuss et al. (2016) investigated nudges, social norms, and 
permanence in agri-environmental schemes. 
Among interesting behavioural-related issues one can also include farmers’ self-
initiated activities. A study of Dutch self-initiated activities through a farmers 
survey is provided by Runhaar et al. (2018), highlighting the different variables 
having a positive (e.g. organic farming) or negative (degree of intensity) on such 
activities. 
Awareness is also a key to understanding behaviour and promoting behavioural 
changes, and related impact on AECPG production. Okumah et al. (2018) 
provide an example related to mitigating agriculture diffuse pollution. 
Learning and behavioural changes are also highlighted in the literature. For 
example, the interpretation of monitoring as a learning process (potentially a 
very important issue in result-based solutions) is highlighted by Darnhofer et al. 
(2017).  
Behavioural issues are more often investigated to explain low participation rates; 
e.g., see Rolfe et al. (2018) for conservation tenders. 
Pro-environmental behaviour is per se an issue. See for example the case of 
landowners in Southwestern Ontario, Canada as studied by Nebel et al. (2017). 
Heterogeneity in behaviour and practice adoption is a very relevant issue (Rolfe 
and Harvey, 2017), often explicitly or implicitly neglected.  
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4.3.8 Governance 
Governance and institutional organisation in the provision of PGs are relevant 
issues already studies for AESs. For example different institutional organizations are 
explored by Mettepenningen et al. (2013) for Flanders, in Belgium; and the state 
of Arkansas, in the US. The study highlights the importance of flexibility. 
Governance may include different aspects, such as: a) reliability of the 
instrument/contract (does the instrument do what it intends to do, is that well 
substantiated); b) reliability of the data (entered data (by farmer/forester/land 
owner, etc), and reliability of the standard data in the model; c) Self-regulation 
or third party control. 
Different solutions from a governance perspectives in promoting nature 
conservation are explored by Runhaar et al. (2018) in the case of Dutch farmers. 
Governance perspectives may be linked to behavioural issues and finally to 
contract design in several ways. For example, Huising and Silbey (2018) identifies 
four levers used at frontline of an organization to encourage compliance in 
organizations: “nudge (individual), bureaucracy (roles, rules, and procedures), 
relational governance (network), and organizational culture (assumptions, 




Considering the current setting of the CAP and the emphasis on new and 
innovative solutions such as result-based and value chain-related design 
approaches, evaluation is a structural part of contracts and policy design and 
key issue to understand feasibility and impact itself. 
In literature, a number of parameters impacting on and defining the 
performance of contractual solutions for AECPG provision are discussed. Most 
prominent are the design parameters of targeting, flexibility, equity/fairness, 
compatibility, profitability as well as the building of social/cultural capital, all 
impacting on the higher-level performance criteria of longevity, effectiveness 
and acceptance of the contracts. Moreover, partly context-related 
performance aspects such as feasibility of implementation are relevant. 
Naturally, main parameters are characterised by underlying 
principles/variables/sub-criteria. For example, longevity, as one main 
performance parameter, is driven by aspects such as the length of the contracts, 
the stability of participation, but also by aspects related to education/advice/ 
training/ information and the related building of social/cultural capital, and/or 
the support by the farming community.  
Eventually, performance parameters are interrelated, while performance in one 
performance parameter can have immediate effects on another and those 
effects can be reinforcing as well as adverse. For example, compatibility of the 
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contract with the land users’ business design and with the legal system will 
expectedly have a positive effect on acceptance. 
Therefore, an important issue is that of clarifying trade-offs among different 
performance objectives. Trade-offs between participation and effort are 
addressed by Schilizzi and Latacz-Lohmann (2016). Design issues in managing 
trade-offs between equity and efficiency are addressed by Chu et al. (2019). Wu 
and Yu (2017) develop an analytic framework to analyze the trade-off between 
economic efficiency and distributional equity in targeting payments for 
ecosystem services (PES).  
Figure 4 illustrates the main performance parameters and the underlying sub 
criteria, as well as some of the interrelations.  
              
 
40 




              
 
41 
This project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation 
programme under grant agreement GA 817949 
 
4.4.2 List of potential performance indicators 
Below a list of potential performance indicators, is provided, including definitions 
and key references: 
Effectiveness  




the  target  in  terms  of  provision  of  (single  or multiple)  AECPGs.  For  example  define 
Börner  et  al.  (2017),  in  their  analysis  of  the  the  effectiveness  of  payments  for 













The longevity is impacted by the length of the contracts, the stability of 
participation in the measures (avoiding exit from measures schemes before the 
end of contract), the duration of practices promoted by measures beyond the 
contract period, by the continuity of measures across different programming 
periods (i.e. integrated or organic production), by the support of the farming 
community (de Snoo et al., 2013) and by the education, advice, training, and 
information provided (Morris, 2004; Batáry et al., 2015; Meyer et al., 2015).  
Acceptance  
Acceptance refers to the willingness of a person (e.g. landmanagers/-owners) to 
participate in a programme, for example an AES or new contract solution, based 
on a positive attitude towards this programme. Acceptance by affected actors 
is a precondition for successful implementation. Acceptance is influenced by a 
broad number of endogenous and exogeneous factors, such as framework 
conditions, behavioural aspects, education and knowledge, etc. The construct 
of acceptance is also affected by other constructs (performance criteria) such 
as trust, equity and fairness, compatibility etc.  
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Additional drivers of acceptance are  
 Ease of fit within existing farms and farming systems (Batáry et al., 2015) 
 Ease  of  fit  with  actors/stakeholders  attitude  to  risk,  environment,  and  innovation 
(Herzon et al., 2018)  
 Visibility of the sense of the contract solution to the participants (Batáry et al., 2015)  
 Moral  conviction, meaning  that  participants  think  that  the  performed  tasks  in  the 
contract  solution  are  necessary  and  not  morally  questionable  (Burton  and 
Paragahawewa, 2011).  
Targeting  
Poor targeting of contract objectives is a major criterion for low economic and 
environmental effectiveness (Robalino et al., 2008). Improved targeting involves 
the following aspects:  
 Spatial/geographical  targeting  aims  to  target  resources  to  a  defined  area/region  in 
order to address specific environmental criticalities (OECD, 2012).  
 Cost/benefit  targeting,  combining  spatial  targeting  with  auctions  or  performance 
payments (Schomers and Matzdorf, 2013);   
 Structural  targeting,  aims  to  target  specific  farm  and  forestry  types  to  be  covered 
(OECD, 2012).  
 Environmental  (AECPG)  targeting,  setting  well‐defined  environmental  objectives 
(Herzon et al., 2018; OECD, 2012). 
 Additionality, dealing with  the  topic of deadweight effects  in  the  implementation of 
environmental  programs.  An  example  for  deadweight  effects  is  that  farmers  only 
participate in programs they already fulfil the requirements. Additionality in contrast, 
means that the contract solution causes direct changes  in  land/resources use among 




Increased flexibility enables the adaptation of contract solutions to different 
context situations, conditions and challenges (Waylen and Martin-Ortega, 2018).  
 Contract  length  flexibility:  Meyer  et  al.  (2015),  in  their  review  on  the  influence  of 
contract length on AEM success, hypothesise that flexibility in contract length is relevant 
as it influences participation (Mettepenningen et al., 2013). There are clear preferences 
for different  contract  lengths by  farmers  (Ruto and Garrod, 2009). Societally optimal 
contract lengths vary with socio‐economic and ecological factors (Ando and Chen, 2011) 
The  flexibility of  the contract  length, which considers  the conditions, can benefit  the 
success of agri‐environmental programs (Khanna and Ando, 2009). 
 Technical, temporal, area wise application flexibility:  Meyer et al. (2015) and  Siebert, 
Toogood  and  Knierim  (2006)  state  that  flexibility  of  agri‐environmental measures  is 
crucial  for success:  flexibility  in AEMs  in terms of application might be given through 
choosing  the  enrolled  land  (Mettepenningen  et  al.,  2013)  or  by  choosing  the  farm 
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in  terms  of  participation,  farmers  have  positive  preferences  for  flexibility  over  the 
enrolled land and over the applied techniques (Ruto and Garrod (2009).  
 Flexible  payment  conditions:  Herzon  et  al.  2018  argue  that  inflexible  payment 
conditions can be one of the key reasons for poor effectiveness.  





Equity and fairness in the context of payments for ecosystem services in literature 
are discussed mainly in the context of developing countries. However, in 
connection to innovative contract solutions in CONSOLE and particularly when 
taking into account value-chain based solutions, involving actors with differing 
bargaining powers, the aspect appears relevant. Moreover, equity is also 
mentioned as a “key element to be taken into account when designing and 
implementing […] PES” (Corbera et al., 2007). According to Schomers and 
Matzdorf, (2013), equity in the context of payments for environmental services 
include three elements, namely equity in access (who participates), equity in 
decision making (procedural fairness within the project framework) and equity in 
the outcome and fair payments (distribution of project outcomes among actors, 
in particular payments and their perceived fairness of their distribution) 
(Schomers and Matzdorf, 2013). Perceived fairness is influenced mainly by the 
perception of risk, costs, and benefits.  
Compatibility. 
 Compatibility  with  the  business  design  of  participants:  It  is  obvious  that  farmers’ 
acceptance of environmental friendly measures depends on the degree of integrability 
in  their  farming  concept.  The  effectiveness  of  agro‐environmental  programs  could 
therefore be  improved by creating more customised,  tailored schemes,  fitting  to  the 
farming  styles  (concept  which  integrates  human  attitudes  ,  farming  objectives  and 





Contract solutions, particularly payments for Ecosystem Services (PES) or result 
based approaches, can be directly profitable for the farmers/foresters as well as 
for other actors in the contract solution. In contrast, contract solutions that don't 
(or just) cover the costs of management changes (e.g. opportunity costs) and 
therefore reduce (or at least don't increase) the profitability of contracting actors 
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are assumed to be not well accepted or long-lasting or self-enforcing (see 
Deliverable 2.3 of the CONSOLE project). 
Social/cultural capital  
Effective AESs need to consider and build up non-economic forms of capital, 
particularly to achieve awareness building and guaranteeing longevity (Burton 
and Paragahawewa, 2011, Pretty, 2003). 
Besides economic capital (resources as material property), capital exists in the 
forms of social capital (resources that can be mobilized via social connections 
and mutual obligations), and cultural capital (resources in the form of 
knowledge, skills, dispositions, and possession of culturally significant objects). Via 
symbolic capital (status, prestige, and reputation) capital is transferrable 
between its different forms (Burton and Paragahawewa, 2011). 
Cultural capital can be built up, and eventually be measured by:   
 Certificates from recognized farmers organizations (companies, farmers unions, breed 








 Payments  for  reaching  set  of  targets,  instead  of  payments  for  prescribed  activities, 
increases the cultural capital (Burton and Paragahawewa, 2011, p. 101) 





strengthened  –  for  example,  through  meeting  other  farmers  at  sheep  sales,  breed 
society events, (Coughenour, 1976) (Holt, 1997, p. 109) 




The feasibility of implementation of contractual solution is mainly challenged by 
program costs (transaction and implementation costs), as well as property rights 
and their distribution (Schomers and Matzdorf, 2013). Moreover, feasibility is 
driven by assistance to implementation while a lack of assistance can lead to 
frustration and the eventually to quitting participation in the contractual solution 
(Morris, 2004). To increase feasibility, land managers need to be provided with 
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education, advice, training, and information (Meyer et al., 2015; Batáry et al., 
2015). 
Trust  
A culture of trust between all stakeholders influences the effectiveness of the 
scheme (Herzon et al. 2018). Particularly this related to trusting that the contract 
partners fulfil the terms of the contract (Schomers and Matzdorf, 2013). In order 
to enhance trust, good and transparent communication is crucial. Such 
communication is characterized by e.g. the exchange rate, the involvement of 
all important contract partners in the communication process and the full 
disclosure of information. 
Performance will need to be evaluated against a counterfactual/reference. 
Here we propose two different strategies: 
 For the cases studies diagnostics  in WP2, that are totally ex post, the performance  is 
evaluated in principle according to RDP (CMEF) counterfactual thinking, i.e. comparing 
the  state  of  the  area  involved  would  the  measure  not  have  been  implemented. 
However, given the nature of the study (mostly qualitative) and the different state of 







4.4.3 Institutional evaluation and policy implementation 
While this evaluation framework is based on the literature, the purpose of the 
project is to take into account as well the policy implementation needs. In 
particular, in the further steps we will consider to adapt this framework to take 
into account the future CAP monitoring framework and needs. Some already 
identified references for this are: 
o the annex 1 of the CAP proposal (that define the impact, results and output 
indicators); 
o the general guidelines for evaluation of interventions/instruments at EU level, 
that usually consider five criteria: effectiveness, efficiency, relevance, coherence 
and EU added value; 
o the use of an intervention logic approach as adopted in evaluation studies, 
e.g., Bergevoet et al. (2019).  
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5 Methods and stakeholder engagement 
Many methods are used in the literature to study AECPGs provision. These 
methods can also support the design and implementation of contract solutions 
addressed in this project. This section does not have the ambition to provide a 
comprehensive review of methods, but just to recall some of the main 
methodological pathways of current research and to connect them with 
participatory decision making. Further insights may develop in view of WP3 and 
WP4 of the CONSOLE project. 
A wide range of variants of stated preference methods and economic 
experiments (Colen et al., 2016) are used to analyse behavioural issues related 
to AECPGs. A collection of these studies with mainly reference to contract design 
features are reported in appendix 1. 
Models are used in different variants. Here below some examples in addition to 
those cited in the previous chapters. 
Drechsler (2017) analysed performance of Input- and Output-based Payments 
for the Conservation of Mobile Species using a conceptual model. 
Groeneveld et al. (2018) provide a multi-objective model of collective 
participation in Dutch AES schemes to assess participation and impact on 
biodiversity. 
Cho et al. (2019) investigate optimal targeting through multi-objective analysis in 
forestry. 
Bamière et al. (2011) perform a farming system modelling for agri-environmental 
policy design, applied to the case of a spatially non-aggregated allocation of 
conservation measures.  
Combined approaches are of growing importance. For example, Conrad and 
Yates (2018) couple stated preferences with a hydrological water resource 
model to inform water policies. 
 
The role of stakeholder’s engagement through participatory approaches is now 
recognised to be key for the study, design and implementation of policies and 
coordination instruments related to AECPGs. This is also a major aspect of the 
CONSOLE project. Civil society actors are recognised to be at the nexus of the 
ecosystem services concept and agri-environmental policies (Meyer et al., 2016) 
and are particularly relevant when looking at solutions implying voluntary 
participation, contracting or collaboration among actors. This is relevant to the 
framework, in order to help provide scientific support to procedural indications.  
There is a growing literature on the topic. Sterling et al. (2017) identify three main 
types of stakeholder engagement (externally driven, self-organised, mixed). In 
relation to this, they identify the dimensions that affect the successful outcomes 
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of an engagement process. They conclude that understanding of governance 
and social-cultural context plays an important role in all types of stakeholder 
engagement efforts. 
Different studies provide evidence about the role of bridging organisations in 
fostering social learning and change by farmers. Dedeurwaerdere, Polard and 
Melindi-Ghidi (2015) provided an example from Wallonia finding that farmers 
having periodic contacts with network bridging organisations show a higher 
commitment to change. 
Bridging social capital and the role of regionalization is analysed by de Krom 
(2017) that finds that these factors are key to lead to long-term, pro-
environmental behaviour change of farmers. 
Social capital is also linked to discourses and concepts used. For example 
landscape services can be interpreted as boundary concepts in landscape 
governance, in order to build social capital (Westerink et al., 2017). 
The role of farm advisors can be pivotal, but their opinion is often little 
investigated. In a survey exploring private farm advisor perspectives of agri-
environment schemes, Hejnowicz, Rudd, and White (2016) found that “the 
'knowledge-exchange encounter' occurring between themselves, their clients 
and Natural England is fundamental to the environmental effectiveness of these 
schemes as well as their farm business compatibility”  
Studying implementation of PG-related contracts in post socialist countries, 
Prazan and Theesfeld (2014) found that factors such as trust and reciprocity 
between farmers and state administrative bodies, information spreading and the 
availability of advisory services are key to scheme performances. Also, there is a 
dynamic aspect behind this, as trust tends to grow following a previous good 
experience. 
Role of intermediaries to foster the implementation of innovative land 
management practice for ecosystem service provision can also involve directly 
researchers as active players (Schröter et al., 2015). 
Some papers propose also procedures to use research outcomes in design 
processes. E.g., interactive modelling is proposed by Hassanzadeh et al. (2019), 
who also provide a framework for stakeholders’ engagement related to water 
management. 
 
6 Discussion, conclusions and the next steps 
This document aims to build a preliminary conceptual framework for the project 
CONSOLE. The initial and intermediate drafts have been the basis for initial 
coordination among WPs. Specifically, this task supported WP2 in setting up the 
data collection protocols, the preliminary understanding of key behavioural 
              
 
48 
This project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation 
programme under grant agreement GA 817949 
 
topics for the survey in WP3, initial modelling issues in WP4, the identification of 
relevant actors and stakeholders for WP5 and WP6. 












Some of the developments of this document can be already envisaged; each 




 It would be useful  to provide also a  glossary  linking empirically  relevant or  common 
understanding with scientific terminology; 










The direct follow-ups of this document will be in: 
 D1.2:  Identification  of  potential  improved  solutions  (due  month  13  though  slightly 
delayed); 




Additionally, they are relevant to all other WPs. 
              
 
49 
This project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation 










              
 
50 
This project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation 
programme under grant agreement GA 817949 
 
8 References 
Ando, A. W. & Chen, X. 2011. Optimal contract lengths for voluntary ecosystem service 
provision with varied dynamic benefit functions. Conservation Letters, 4, 207-218. 
Aghion, Philippe, and Richard Holden. 2011. “Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of 
the Firm : What Have We Learned over the Past 25 Years ?” The Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 25(2):181–97. 
Ajzen, Icek. 1985. “From Intentions to Actions: A Theory of Planned Behavior.” Pp. 11–39 
in Action control. Springer. 
Ando, A. W., and C. Langpap. 2018. “The Economics of Species Conservation.” Annual 
Review of Resource Economics 10:445–67. 
Arnott, D., D. Chadwick, I. Harris, A. Koj, and D. L. Jones. 2019. “What Can Management 
Option Uptake Tell Us about Ecosystem Services Delivery through Agri-Environment 
Schemes?” Land Use Policy 81:194–208. 
Bamière, L., P. Havlík, F. Jacquet, M. Lherm, G. Millet, and V. Bretagnolle. 2011. “Farming 
System Modelling for Agri-Environmental Policy Design: The Case of a Spatially Non-
Aggregated Allocation of Conservation Measures.” Ecological Economics 
70(5):891–99. 
Baron, By David P. 2010. “Morally Motivated Self-Regulation.” American Economie 
Review 100(4):1299–1329. 
Batáry, Péter, Lynn V. Dicks, David Kleijn, and William J. Sutherland. 2015. “The Role of 
Agri-Environment Schemes in Conservation and Environmental Management.” 
Conservation Biology 29(4):1006–16. 
Bergevoet, R. H. M., Olivier Chartier, R. A. Jongeneel, Guillaume Pierre, C. P. A. van 
Wagenberg, MAPM van Asseldonk, Marjolein Selten, H. J. Silvis, Giulia Martino, and 
Irma Sani. 2019. Improving Crisis Prevention and Management Criteria and 
Strategies in the Agricultural Sector. EC. 
Birge, T., and I. Herzon. 2019. “Exploring Cultural Acceptability of a Hypothetical Results-
Based Agri-Environment Payment for Grassland Biodiversity.” Journal of Rural Studies 
67:1–11. 
Birge, T., M. Toivonen, M. Kaljonen, and I. Herzon. 2017. “Probing the Grounds: Developing 
a Payment-by-Results Agri-Environment Scheme in Finland.” Land Use Policy 61:302–
15. 
Börner, Jan, Kathy Baylis, Esteve Corbera, Driss Ezzine-de-Blas, Jordi Honey-Rosés, U. 
Martin Persson, and Sven Wunder. 2017. “The Effectiveness of Payments for 
Environmental Services.” World Development 96(April):359–74. 
Brink, Lars. 2009. “WTO Constraints on Domestic Support in Agriculture: Past and Future.” 
Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics/Revue Canadienne d’agroeconomie 
57(1):1–21. 
Bureau, Jean-Christophe. 2017. “Does the WTO Discipline Really Constrain the Design of 
CAP Payments.” Blog Post Http://Capreform. Eu/Does-the-Wto-Discipline-Really-
Constrain-the-Design-of-Cap-Payments. 
Burton, R. J. F., and G. Schwarz. 2013. “Result-Oriented Agri-Environmental Schemes in 
Europe and Their Potential for Promoting Behavioural Change.” Land Use Policy 
30(1):628–41. 
              
 
51 
This project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation 
programme under grant agreement GA 817949 
 
Burton, Rob J. F., and Upananda Herath Paragahawewa. 2011. “Creating Culturally 
Sustainable Agri-Environmental Schemes.” Journal of Rural Studies 27(1):95–104. 
Chamberlain, Wytske, and Ward Anseeuw. 2019. “Inclusive Businesses in Agriculture: 
Defining the Concept and Its Complex and Evolving Partnership Structures in the 
Field.” Land Use Policy 83:308–22. 
Chang, Sheng Han Erin, David Wuepper, Alois Heissenhuber, and Johannes Sauer. 2017. 
“Investigating Rice Farmers’ Preferences for an Agri-Environmental Scheme: Is an 
Eco-Label a Substitute for Payments?” Land Use Policy 64:374–82. 
Cho, S. H., M. Soh, B. C. English, T. E. Yu, and C. N. Boyer. 2019. “Targeting Payments for 
Forest Carbon Sequestration given Ecological and Economic Objectives.” Forest 
Policy and Economics 100:214–26. 
Cho, W., and D. Blandford. 2018. “Bilateral Information Asymmetry in the Design of an 
Agri-Environmental Policy: An Application to Peatland Retirement in Norway.” 
Journal of Agricultural Economics. 
Christensen, Tove, Anders Branth Pedersen, Helle Oersted Nielsen, Morten Raun Mørkbak, 
Berit Hasler, and Sigrid Denver. 2011. “Determinants of Farmers’ Willingness to 
Participate in Subsidy Schemes for Pesticide-Free Buffer Zones-A Choice Experiment 
Study.” Ecological Economics 70(8):1558–64. 
Chu, L., R. Quentin Grafton, and R. Keenan. 2019. “Increasing Conservation Efficiency 
While Maintaining Distributive Goals With the Payment for Environmental Services.” 
Ecological Economics 156:202–10. 
Le Coent, Philippe, Raphaële Préget, and Sophie Thoyer. 2017. “Compensating 
Environmental Losses Versus Creating Environmental Gains: Implications for 
Biodiversity Offsets.” Ecological Economics 142:120–29. 
Coggan, A., S. M. Whitten, and J. Bennett. 2010. “Influences of Transaction Costs in 
Environmental Policy.” Ecological Economics 69(9):1777–84. 
Colen, L., S. Gomez y Paloma, U. Latacz-Lohmann, M. Lefebvre, R. Préget, and S. Thoyer. 
2016. “Economic Experiments as a Tool for Agricultural Policy Evaluation: Insights 
from the European CAP.” Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics 64(4):667–94. 
Conrad, S. A., and D. Yates. 2018. “Coupling Stated Preferences with a Hydrological 
Water Resource Model to Inform Water Policies for Residential Areas in the 
Okanagan Basin, Canada.” Journal of Hydrology 564:846–58. 
Cooper, Tamsin, Kaley Hart, and David Baldock. 2009. The Provision of Public Goods 
through Agriculture in the European Union. London. 
Corbera, E., Kosoy, N. & Martinez Tuna, M. 2007. Equity implications of marketing 
ecosystem services in protected areas and rural communities: Case studies from 
Meso-America. Global Environmental Change, 17, 365-380. 
Coughenour, C. M. 1976. A theory of instrumental activity and farm enterprise 
commitment applied to woolgrowing in Australia. Rural Sociology, 41, 76-98. 
Darnhofer, I., M. Schermer, M. Steinbacher, M. Gabillet, and K. Daugstad. 2017. 
“Preserving Permanent Mountain Grasslands in Western Europe: Why Are Promising 
Approaches Not Implemented More Widely?” Land Use Policy 68:306–15. 
Davies, Ben B., and Ian D. Hodge. 2006. “Farmers’ Preferences for New Environmental 
Policy Instruments: Determining the Acceptability of Cross Compliance for 
              
 
52 
This project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation 
programme under grant agreement GA 817949 
 
Biodiversity Benefits.” Journal of Agricultural Economics 57(3):393–414. 
Dedeurwaerdere, T., A. Polard, and P. Melindi-Ghidi. 2015. “The Role of Network Bridging 
Organisations in Compensation Payments for Agri-Environmental Services under the 
EU Common Agricultural Policy.” Ecological Economics 119:24–38. 
Derissen, Sandra, and Martin F. Quaas. 2013. “Combining Performance-Based and 
Action-Based Payments to Provide Environmental Goods under Uncertainty.” 
Ecological Economics 85:77–84. 
Dessart, François J., Jesús Barreiro-Hurlé, and René van Bavel. 2019. “Behavioural Factors 
Affecting the Adoption of Sustainable Farming Practices: A Policy-Oriented Review.” 
European Review of Agricultural Economics 46(3):417–71. 
Drechsler, M. 2017. “Performance of Input- and Output-Based Payments for the 
Conservation of Mobile Species.” Ecological Economics 134:49–56. 
Drechsler, M., K. Johst, and F. Wätzold. 2017. “The Cost-Effective Length of Contracts for 
Payments to Compensate Land Owners for Biodiversity Conservation Measures.” 
Biological Conservation 207:72–79. 
Ekroos, Johan, Ola Olsson, Maj Rundlöf, Frank Wätzold, and Henrik G. Smith. 2014. 
“Optimizing Agri-Environment Schemes for Biodiversity, Ecosystem Services or Both?” 
Biological Conservation 172:65–71. 
Erjavec, Karmen, and Emil Erjavec. 2015. “‘Greening the CAP’ - Just a Fashionable 
Justification? A Discourse Analysis of the 2014-2020 CAP Reform Documents.” Food 
Policy 51(2015):53–62. 
Espinosa-Goded, M., J. Barreiro-Hurlé, and P. Dupraz. 2013. “Identifying Additional Barriers 
in the Adoption of Agri-Environmental Schemes: The Role of Fixed Costs.” Land Use 
Policy 31:526–35. 
Espinosa-Goded, Maria, Jesús Barreiro-Hurlé, and Eric Ruto. 2010. “What Do Farmers Want 
from Agri-Environmental Scheme Design? A Choice Experiment Approach.” Journal 
of Agricultural Economics 61(2):259–73. 
European Commission. 2019. Analysis of Administrative Burden Arising from the CAP. 
European Court of Auditors. 2011. Is Agri-Environment Support Well Designed and 
Managed? 
European Network for Rural Development. 2016a. “Collective Approaches to AECM.” 
European Network for Rural Development. 2016b. Result-Based Approaches to AECM. 
Ferraro, P. J. 2008. “Asymmetric Information and Contract Design for Payments for 
Environmental Services.” Ecological Economics 65(4):810–21. 
Fishbein, Martin, and Icek Ajzen. 1975. “Intention and Behavior: An Introduction to Theory 
and Research.” 
Fleury, Philippe, Claire Seres, Laurent Dobremez, Baptiste Nettier, and Yves Pauthenet. 
2015. “‘Flowering Meadows’, a Result-Oriented Agri-Environmental Measure: 
Technical and Value Changes in Favour of Biodiversity.” Land Use Policy 46:103–14. 
Franks, J. R., and S. B. Emery. 2013. “Incentivising Collaborative Conservation: Lessons from 
Existing Environmental Stewardship Scheme Options.” Land Use Policy 30(1):847–62. 
Franzén, Frida, Patrik Dinnétz, and Monica Hammer. 2016. “Factors Affecting Farmers’ 
              
 
53 
This project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation 
programme under grant agreement GA 817949 
 
Willingness to Participate in Eutrophication Mitigation — A Case Study of Preferences 
for Wetland Creation in Sweden.” Ecological Economics 130:8–15. 
Fraser, R. 2012. “Moral Hazard, Targeting and Contract Duration in Agri-Environmental 
Policy.” Journal of Agricultural Economics 63(1):56–64. 
Fraser, Rob. 2002. “Moral Hazard and Risk Management in Agri-environmental Policy.” 
Journal of Agricultural Economics 53(3):475–87. 
Gatto, P., D. Mozzato, and E. Defrancesco. 2019. “Analysing the Role of Factors Affecting 
Farmers’ Decisions to Continue with Agri-Environmental Schemes from a Temporal 
Perspective.” Environmental Science and Policy 92:237–44. 
Greiner, Romy. 2016. “Factors Influencing Farmers’ Participation in Contractual 
Biodiversity Conservation: A Choice Experiment with Northern Australian 
Pastoralists.” Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 60(1):1–21. 
Groeneveld, A. N., J. H. M. Peerlings, M. M. Bakker, N. B. P. Polman, and W. J. M. Heijman. 
2018. “Effects on Participation and Biodiversity of Reforming the Implementation of 
Agri-Environmental Schemes in the Netherlands.” Ecological Complexity. 
Groth, M. 2011. “Cost-Effective Biodiversity Conservation:Procurement Auctions and 
Payment-by-Results.” EuroChoices 10(2):32–37. 
Hanley, Nick, Simanti Banerjee, Gareth D. Lennox, and Paul R. Armsworth. 2012. “How 
Should We Incentivize Private Landowners to ‘Produce’More Biodiversity?” Oxford 
Review of Economic Policy 28(1):93–113. 
Hart, B. Y. Oliver, and John Moore. 1988. “Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation.” 
Econometrica 56(4):755–85. 
Hart, Oliver, and John Moore. 1999. “Foundations of Incomplete Contracts.” The Review 
of Economic Studies 66(1):115–38. 
Hasler, Berit, Mikolaj Czajkowski, Katarina Elofsson, Line Block Hansen, Maria Theresia 
Konrad, Helle Ørsted Nielsen, Olli Niskanen, Tea Nõmmann, Anders Branth Pedersen, 
Kaja Peterson, Helen Poltimäe, Tobias Häggmark Svensson, and Katarzyna Zagórska. 
2019. “Farmers’ Preferences for Nutrient and Climate-Related Agri-Environmental 
Schemes: A Cross-Country Comparison.” Ambio 48(11):1290–1303. 
Hassanzadeh, E., G. Strickert, L. Morales-Marin, B. Noble, H. Baulch, E. Shupena-Soulodre, 
and K. E. Lindenschmidt. 2019. “A Framework for Engaging Stakeholders in Water 
Quality Modeling and Management: Application to the Qu’Appelle River Basin, 
Canada.” Journal of Environmental Management 231:1117–26. 
Hejnowicz, A. P., M. A. Rudd, and P. C. L. White. 2016. “A Survey Exploring Private Farm 
Advisor Perspectives of Agri-Environment Schemes: The Case of England’s 
Environmental Stewardship Programme.” Land Use Policy 55:240–56. 
Herzon, I., T. Birge, B. Allen, A. Povellato, F. Vanni, K. Hart, G. Radley, G. Tucker, C. 
Keenleyside, R. Oppermann, E. Underwood, X. Poux, G. Beaufoy, and J. Pražan. 
2018. “Time to Look for Evidence: Results-Based Approach to Biodiversity 
Conservation on Farmland in Europe.” Land Use Policy 71(December 2017):347–54. 
Hodge, Ian. 2001. “Beyond Agri-Environmental Policy: Towards an Alternative Model of 
Rural Environmental Governance.” Land Use Policy 18(2):99–111. 
Holmstrom, Bengt. 1982. “Moral Hazard in Teams.” The Bell Journal of Economics 
13(2):324–40. 
              
 
54 
This project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation 
programme under grant agreement GA 817949 
 
Holt, Douglas B. 1997. “Distinction in America? Recovering Bourdieu’s Theory of Tastes 
from Its Critics.” Poetics 25(2–3):93–120. 
Hope, Rob, Mamta Borgoyary, and Chetan Agarwal. 2008. “Smallholder Preferences for 
Agri-Environmental Change at the Bhoj Wetland, India.” Development Policy 
Review 26(5):585–602. 
Huising, R., and S. S. Silbey. 2018. “From Nudge to Culture and Back Again: Coalface 
Governance in the Regulated Organization.” Annual Review of Law and Social 
Science 14:91–114. 
Jones, James;, Paul; Silcock, and Tetsuya Uetake. 2015. Public Goods and Externalities: 
Agri-Environmental Policy Measures in the United Kingdom. Paris. 
Kanchanaroek, Yingluck, and Uzma Aslam. 2018. “Policy Schemes for the Transition to 
Sustainable Agriculture—Farmer Preferences and Spatial Heterogeneity in Northern 
Thailand.” Land Use Policy 78(September 2017):227–35. 
Kempa, D. 2013. “Environmental Services Coupled to Food Products and Brands: Food 
Companies Interests and on-Farm Accounting.” Journal of Environmental 
Management 127:S184–90. 
Khanna, Madhu, and Amy W. Ando. 2009. “Science, Economics and the Design of 
Agricultural Conservation Programmes in the US.” Journal of Environmental Planning 
and Management 52(5):575–92. 
Kotchen, Matthew J., and Kathleen Segerson. 2018. “On the Use of Group Performance 
and Rights for Environmental Protection and Resource Management.” Proceedings 
of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 116(12):5285–
92. 
de Krom, M. P. M. M. 2017. “Farmer Participation in Agri-Environmental Schemes: 
Regionalisation and the Role of Bridging Social Capital.” Land Use Policy 60:352–61. 
Kuhfuss, L., R. Préget, S. Thoyer, N. Hanley, P. Le Coent, and M. Désolé. 2016. “Nudges, 
Social Norms, and Permanence in Agri-Environmental Schemes.” Land Economics 
92(4):641–55. 
Kuhfuss, Laure, Raphaële Préget, Sophie Thoyer, Nick Hanley, Laure Kuhfuss, Raphaële 
Préget, Sophie Thoyer, and Nick Hanley. 2015. “Nudging Farmers to Sign Agri-
Environmental Contracts : The Effects of a Collective Bonus To Cite This Version : HAL 
Id : Hal-01148581 University of St . Andrews Discussion Papers in Environmental 
Economics.” (October). 
Laffont, Jean-Jacques, and David Martimort. 2001. “The Theory of Incentives I : The 
Principal-Agent Model.” (January 2001):1–382. 
Langlais, Alexandra. 2019. L’agriculture et Les Paiements Pour Services 
Environnementaux. Quels Questionnements Juridiques ? 
Latacz-Lohmann, Uwe, and Gunnar Breustedt. 2019. “Using Choice Experiments to 
Improve the Design of Agri-Environmental Schemes.” European Review of 
Agricultural Economics 46(3):495–528. 
Lefebvre, Marianne, Maria Espinosa, Sergio Gomez y Paloma, Maria Luisa Paracchini, 
Annette Piorr, and Ingo Zasada. 2015. “Agricultural Landscapes as Multi-Scale Public 
Good and the Role of the Common Agricultural Policy.” Journal of Environmental 
Planning and Management 58(12):2088–2112. 
              
 
55 
This project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation 
programme under grant agreement GA 817949 
 
Lienhoop, Nele, and Roy Brouwer. 2015. “Agri-Environmental Policy Valuation: Farmers’ 
Contract Design Preferences for Afforestation Schemes.” Land Use Policy 42:568–77. 
Mato-Amboage, R., J. W. Pitchford, and J. Touza. 2018. “Public–Private Partnerships for 
Biosecurity: An Opportunity for Risk Sharing.” Journal of Agricultural Economics. 
Matzdorf, B., and J. Lorenz. 2010. “How Cost-Effective Are Result-Oriented Agri-
Environmental Measures?-An Empirical Analysis in Germany.” Land Use Policy 
27(2):535–44. 
Merckx, Thomas, and Henrique M. Pereira. 2015. “Reshaping Agri-Environmental 
Subsidies: From Marginal Farming to Large-Scale Rewilding.” Basic and Applied 
Ecology 16(2):95–103. 
Mettepenningen, E., V. Vandermeulen, K. Delaet, G. Van Huylenbroeck, and E. J. Wailes. 
2013. “Investigating the Influence of the Institutional Organisation of Agri-
Environmental Schemes on Scheme Adoption.” Land Use Policy 33:20–30. 
Meyer, C., S. Schomers, B. Matzdorf, C. Biedermann, and C. Sattler. 2016. “Civil Society 
Actors at the Nexus of the Ecosystem Services Concept and Agri-Environmental 
Policies.” Land Use Policy 55:352–56. 
Meyer, Claas, Michaela Reutter, Bettina Matzdorf, Claudia Sattler, and Sarah Schomers. 
2015. “Design Rules for Successful Governmental Payments for Ecosystem Services: 
Taking Agri-Environmental Measures in Germany as an Example.” Journal of 
Environmental Management 157:146–59. 
Morris, Carol. 2004. “Networks of Agri-Environmental Policy Implementation: A Case 
Studyof England’s Countryside Stewardship Scheme.” Land Use Policy 21(2). 
Moxey, A., and B. White. 2014. “Result-Oriented Agri-Environmental Schemes in Europe: 
A Comment.” Land Use Policy 39:397–99. 
Muenich, R. L., M. M. Kalcic, J. Winsten, K. Fisher, M. Day, G. O’Neil, Y. C. Wang, and D. 
Scavia. 2017. “Pay-for-Performance Conservation Using Swat Highlights Need for 
Field-Level Agricultural Conservation.” Transactions of the ASABE 60(6):1925–37. 
Nebel, S., J. Brick, V. A. Lantz, and R. Trenholm. 2017. “Which Factors Contribute to 
Environmental Behaviour of Landowners in Southwestern Ontario, Canada?” 
Environmental Management 60(3):454–63. 
Núñez-Regueiro, M. M., R. J. Fletcher, E. F. Pienaar, L. C. Branch, J. N. Volante, and S. Rifai. 
2019. “Adding the Temporal Dimension to Spatial Patterns of Payment for Ecosystem 
Services Enrollment.” Ecosystem Services 36. 
OECD. 2012. "Design and implementation of agri-environmental policies: Are 
guidelines feasible?", in Evaluation of Agri-environmental Policies: Selected 
Methodological Issues and Case Studies, OECD Publishing, Paris 
Okumah, M., P. J. Chapman, J. Martin-Ortega, and P. Novo. 2018. “Mitigating Agricultural 
Diffuse Pollution: Uncovering the Evidence Base of the Awareness-Behaviour-Water 
Quality Pathway.” Water (Switzerland) 11(1). 
Opdam, P., I. Coninx, A. Dewulf, E. Steingröver, C. Vos, and M. van der Wal. 2016. “Does 
Information on Landscape Benefits Influence Collective Action in Landscape 
Governance?” Current Opinion in Environmental Sustainability 18:107–14. 
Ostrom, E. 1990. “Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective 
Action.” Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action 
              
 
56 
This project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation 
programme under grant agreement GA 817949 
 
32(2). 
Palm-Forster, L. H., J. F. Suter, and K. D. Messer. 2019. “Experimental Evidence on Policy 
Approaches That Link Agricultural Subsidies to Water Quality Outcomes.” American 
Journal of Agricultural Economics 101(1):109–33. 
Palm-Forster, L. H., S. M. Swinton, F. Lupi, and R. S. Shupp. 2016. “Too Burdensome to Bid: 
Transaction Costs and Pay-for-Performance Conservation.” American Journal of 
Agricultural Economics 98(5):1314–33. 
Peth, D., O. Mußhoff, K. Funke, and N. Hirschauer. 2018. “Nudging Farmers to Comply With 
Water Protection Rules – Experimental Evidence From Germany.” Ecological 
Economics 152:310–21. 
Pinna, S. 2016. “Alternative Food Networks, Agro-Biodiversity and Landscape Protection: 
Lessons from Two Rural Parks.” Regional Studies, Regional Science 3(1):455–62. 
Porter, Michael E., and Mark R. Kramer. 2011. “The Big Idea: Creating Shared Value. How 
to Reinvent Capitalism—and Unleash a Wave of Innovation and Growth.” Harvard 
Business Review 89(1–2). 
Prazan, J., and I. Theesfeld. 2014. “The Role of Agri-Environmental Contracts in Saving 
Biodiversity in the Post-Socialist Czech Republic.” International Journal of the 
Commons 8(1):1–25. 
Pretty, J. 2003. Social Capital and the Collective Management of Resources. Science, 
302, 1912-1914. 
Primdahl, Jørgen, Jens Peter Vesterager, John A. Finn, George Vlahos, Lone Kristensen, 
and Henrik Vejre. 2010. “Current Use of Impact Models for Agri-Environment 
Schemes and Potential for Improvements of Policy Design and Assessment.” Journal 
of Environmental Management 91(6):1245–54. 
Pröbstl-Haider, Ulrike, Nina M. Mostegl, Julia Kelemen-Finan, Wolfgang Haider, Herbert 
Formayer, Jochen Kantelhardt, Tobias Moser, Martin Kapfer, and Ryan Trenholm. 
2016. “Farmers’ Preferences for Future Agricultural Land Use Under the Consideration 
of Climate Change.” Environmental Management 58(3):446–64. 
Reed, M. S., A. Moxey, K. Prager, N. Hanley, J. Skates, A. Bonn, C. D. Evans, K. Glenk, and 
K. Thomson. 2014. “Improving the Link between Payments and the Provision of 
Ecosystem Services in Agri-Environment Schemes.” Ecosystem Services 9:44–53. 
Ridier, Aude. 2012. “Farm Level Supply of Short Rotation Woody Crops: Economic 
Assessment in the Long-Term for Household Farming Systems.” Canadian Journal of 
Agricultural Economics/Revue Canadienne d’agroeconomie 60(3):357–75. 
Riley, M., H. Sangster, H. Smith, R. Chiverrell, and J. Boyle. 2018. “Will Farmers Work 
Together for Conservation? The Potential Limits of Farmers’ Cooperation in Agri-
Environment Measures.” Land Use Policy 70:635–46. 
Robalino, J., Pfaff, A., Sanchez-Azofeifa, G., Alpizar, F., Leon, C., Rodriguez, C., 
2008. Deforestation impacts of environmental services payments: Costa 
Rica's PSA program 2000–2005. Environment for Development Discussion 
Paper—Resources for the Future (RFF) 08–24, pp. 1–16. 
Rocchi, L., L. Paolotti, and F. F. Fagioli. 2017. “Defining Agri-Environmental Schemes in the 
Buffer Areas of a Natural Regional Park: An Application of Choice Experiment Using 
the Latent Class Approach.” Land Use Policy 66(April):141–50. 
              
 
57 
This project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation 
programme under grant agreement GA 817949 
 
Rodríguez-Entrena, M., A. J. Villanueva, and J. A. Gómez-Limón. 2019. “Unraveling 
Determinants of Inferred and Stated Attribute Nonattendance: Effects on Farmers’ 
Willingness to Accept to Join Agri-Environmental Schemes.” Canadian Journal of 
Agricultural Economics 67(1):31–52. 
Rolfe, J., and S. Harvey. 2017. “Heterogeneity in Practice Adoption to Reduce Water 
Quality Impacts from Sugarcane Production in Queensland.” Journal of Rural Studies 
54:276–87. 
Rolfe, J., S. Schilizzi, P. Boxall, U. Latacz-Lohmann, S. Iftekhar, M. Star, and P. O’Connor. 
2018. “Identifying the Causes of Low Participation Rates in Conservation Tenders.” 
International Review of Environmental and Resource Economics 12(1):1–45. 
Romstad, Eirik. 2003. “Team Approaches in Reducing Nonpoint Source Pollution.” 
Ecological Economics 47(1):71–78. 
Rosário, I. T., R. Rebelo, P. Cardoso, P. Segurado, R. N. Mendes, and M. Santos-Reis. 2019. 
“Can Geocaching Be an Indicator of Cultural Ecosystem Services? The Case of the 
Montado Savannah-like Landscape.” Ecological Indicators 99:375–86. 
Roussel, Sébastien. 2019. “Compensation Écologique et Agriculture : Est-Ce 
Compatible ?” 70. 
Runhaar, H., N. Polman, and M. Dijkshoorn-Dekker. 2018. “Self-Initiated Nature 
Conservation by Farmers: An Analysis of Dutch Farming.” International Journal of 
Agricultural Sustainability 16(6):486–97. 
Russi, D., H. Margue, R. Oppermann, and C. Keenleyside. 2016. “Result-Based Agri-
Environment Measures: Market-Based Instruments, Incentives or Rewards? The Case 
of Baden-Württemberg.” Land Use Policy 54:69–77. 
Ruto, E, and G. Garrod. 2009. “Investigating Farmers’ Preferences for the Design of Agri-
Environment Schemes: A Choice Experiment Approach.” Journal of Environmental 
Planning and Management 52(5):631–47. 
Ruto, Eric, and Guy Garrod. 2009. “Investigating Farmers’ Preferences for the Design of 
Agri-Environment Schemes: A Choice Experiment Approach.” Journal of 
Environmental Planning and Management 52(5):631–47. 
De Salvo, Maria, Giuseppe Cucuzza, Salvatore Luciano Cosentino, Lea Nicita, and 
Giovanni Signorello. 2018. “Farmers’ Preferences for Enhancing Sustainability in 
Arable Lands: Evidence from a Choice Experiment in Sicily (Italy).” New Medit 
17(4):57–70. 
Santos, Rui, Pedro Clemente, Roy Brouwer, Paula Antunes, and Rute Pinto. 2016. 
“Landowner Preferences for Agri-Environmental Agreements to Conserve the 
Montado Ecosystem in Portugal.” Ecological Economics 118:159–67. 
Saxby, Heidi, Menelaos Gkartzios, and Karen Scott. 2018. “‘Farming on the Edge’: 
Wellbeing and Participation in Agri-Environmental Schemes.” Sociologia Ruralis 
58(2):392–411. 
Schilizzi, S, and U. Latacz-Lohmann. 2016. “Incentivizing and Tendering Conservation 
Contracts: The Trade-off between Participation and Effort Provision.” Land 
Economics 92(2):273–91. 
Schilizzi, Steven, and Uwe Latacz-Lohmann. 2016. “Incentivizing and Tendering 
Conservation Contracts: The Trade-off between Participation and Effort Provision.” 
Land Economics 92(2):273–91. 
              
 
58 
This project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation 
programme under grant agreement GA 817949 
 
Schmitzberger, I., Th Wrbka, B. Steurer, G. Aschenbrenner, J. Peterseil, and H. G. 
Zechmeister. 2005. “How Farming Styles Influence Biodiversity Maintenance in 
Austrian Agricultural Landscapes.” Agriculture, Ecosystems and Environment 
108(3):274–90. 
Schomers, S., and B. Matzdorf. 2013. “Payments for Ecosystem Services: A Review and 
Comparison of Developing and Industrialized Countries.” Ecosystem Services 6:16–
30. 
Schoonhoven, Y., and H. Runhaar. 2018. “Conditions for the Adoption of Agro-Ecological 
Farming Practices: A Holistic Framework Illustrated with the Case of Almond Farming 
in Andalusia.” International Journal of Agricultural Sustainability 16(6):442–54. 
Schöttker, O., and F. Wätzold. 2018. “Buy or Lease Land? Cost-Effective Conservation of 
an Oligotrophic Lake in a Natura 2000 Area.” Biodiversity and Conservation 
27(6):1327–45. 
Schroeder, L. A., J. Isselstein, S. Chaplin, and S. Peel. 2013. “Agri-Environment Schemes: 
Farmers’ Acceptance and Perception of Potential ‘Payment by Results’ in 
Grassland-A Case Study in England.” Land Use Policy 32:134–44. 
Schröter, B., B. Matzdorf, C. Sattler, and G. Garcia Alarcon. 2015. “Intermediaries to Foster 
the Implementation of Innovative Land Management Practice for Ecosystem 
Service Provision - A New Role for Researchers.” Ecosystem Services 16:192–200. 
Segerson, Kathleen. 1988. “Uncertainty and Incentives for Nonpoint Pollution Control.” 
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 15(1):87–98. 
Sheremet, O., E. Ruokamo, A. Juutinen, R. Svento, and N. Hanley. 2018. “Incentivising 
Participation and Spatial Coordination in Payment for Ecosystem Service Schemes: 
Forest Disease Control Programs in Finland.” Ecological Economics 152:260–72. 
Siebert, Rosemarie, Mark Toogood, and Andrea Knierim. 2006. “Factors Affecting 
European Farmers’ Participation in Biodiversity Policies.” Sociologia Ruralis 46(4):318–
40. 
de Snoo, Geert R., Irina Herzon, Henk Staats, Rob J. F. Burton, Stefan Schindler, Jerry van 
Dijk, Anne Marike Lokhorst, James M. Bullock, Matt Lobley, Thomas Wrbka, Gerald 
Schwarz, and C. J. M. Musters. 2013. “Toward Effective Nature Conservation on 
Farmland: Making Farmers Matter.” Conservation Letters 6(1):66–72. 
Sterling, E. J., E. Betley, A. Sigouin, A. Gomez, A. Toomey, G. Cullman, C. Malone, A. Pekor, 
F. Arengo, M. Blair, C. Filardi, K. Landrigan, and A. L. Porzecanski. 2017. “Assessing 
the Evidence for Stakeholder Engagement in Biodiversity Conservation.” Biological 
Conservation 209:159–71. 
Uetake, Tetsuya. 2012. “Providing Agri-Environmental Public Goods through Collective 
Action : Lessons from New Zealand Case Studies.” in OECD Trade and Agriculture 
Directorate. Tahuna Conference Centre – Nelson, New Zealand. 
Vedel, Suzanne Elizabeth, Jette Bredahl Jacobsen, and Bo Jellesmark Thorsen. 2015. 
“Contracts for Afforestation and the Role of Monitoring for Landowners’ Willingness 
to Accept.” Forest Policy and Economics 51:29–37. 
Viaggi, Davide. 2014. “PROVIding Smart DElivery of Public Goods by EU Agriculture and 
Forestry.” 
Villamayor-Tomas, Sergio, Julian Sagebiel, and Roland Olschewski. 2019. “Bringing the 
Neighbors in: A Choice Experiment on the Influence of Coordination and Social 
              
 
59 
This project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation 
programme under grant agreement GA 817949 
 
Norms on Farmers’ Willingness to Accept Agro-Environmental Schemes across 
Europe.” Land Use Policy 84(March):200–215. 
Villanueva, A. J., M. Rodríguez-Entrena, M. Arriaza, and J. A. Gómez-Limón. 2017. 
“Heterogeneity of Farmers’ Preferences towards Agri-Environmental Schemes 
across Different Agricultural Subsystems.” Journal of Environmental Planning and 
Management 60(4):684–707. 
Villanueva, Anastasio J., José A. Gómez-Limón, and Macario Rodríguez-Entrena. 2017. 
“Valoración de La Oferta de Bienes Públicos Por Parte de Los Sistemas Agrarios: El 
Caso Del Olivar de Montaña En Andalucía.” Economia Agraria y Recursos Naturales 
17(1):25–57. 
Wacquant, Loïc, and Rob Stones. 2006. “Key Contemporary Thinkers.” Londres/Nueva 
York: Macmillan. 
Wainwright, Warwick, Klaus Glenk, Faical Akaichi, and Dominic Moran. 2019. 
“Conservation Contracts for Supplying Farm Animal Genetic Resources (FAnGR) 
Conservation Services in Romania.” Livestock Science 224(March):1–9. 
Waylen, K. J., and J. Martin-Ortega. 2018. “Surveying Views on Payments for Ecosystem 
Services: Implications for Environmental Management and Research.” Ecosystem 
Services 29:23–30. 
Weber, Anja. 2014. “How Are Public Transaction Costs in Regional Agri-Environmental 
Scheme Delivery Influenced by EU Regulations?” Journal of Environmental Planning 
and Management 57(6):937–59. 
Weber, Anja. 2015. “Implementing EU Co-Financed Agri-Environmental Schemes: Effects 
on Administrative Transaction Costs in a Regional Grassland Extensification 
Scheme.” Land Use Policy 42:183–93. 
Weersink, A., E. Fraser, D. Pannell, E. Duncan, and S. Rotz. 2018. “Opportunities and 
Challenges for Big Data in Agricultural and Environmental Analysis.” Annual Review 
of Resource Economics 10:19–37. 
Westerink, J., R. Jongeneel, N. Polman, K. Prager, J. Franks, P. Dupraz, and E. 
Mettepenningen. 2017. “Collaborative Governance Arrangements to Deliver 
Spatially Coordinated Agri-Environmental Management.” Land Use Policy 69:176–
92. 
Westerink, J., D. C. P. Melman, and R. A. M. Schrijver. 2015. “Scale and Self-Governance 
in Agri-Environment Schemes: Experiences with Two Alternative Approaches in the 
Netherlands.” Journal of Environmental Planning and Management 58(8):1490–
1508. 
Westerink, J., P. Opdam, S. van Rooij, and E. Steingröver. 2017. “Landscape Services as 
Boundary Concept in Landscape Governance: Building Social Capital in 
Collaboration and Adapting the Landscape.” Land Use Policy 60:408–18. 
Wezel, A., A. Vincent, H. Nitsch, O. Schmid, M. Dubbert, E. Tasser, P. Fleury, S. Stöckli, M. 
Stolze, and D. Bogner. 2018. “Farmers’ Perceptions, Preferences, and Propositions for 
Result-Oriented Measures in Mountain Farming.” Land Use Policy 70:117–27. 
White, B., and N. Hanley. 2016. “Should We Pay for Ecosystem Service Outputs, Inputs or 
Both?” Environmental and Resource Economics 63(4):765–87. 
White, Ben, and Nick Hanley. 2016. “Should We Pay for Ecosystem Service Outputs, Inputs 
or Both?” Environmental and Resource Economics 63(4):765–87. 
              
 
60 
This project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation 
programme under grant agreement GA 817949 
 
Wrbka, T., S. Schindler, M. Pollheimer, I. Schmitzberger, and J. Peterseil. 2008. “Impact of 
the Austrian Agri-Environmental Scheme on Diversity of Landscapes, Plants and 
Birds.” Community Ecology 9(2):217–27. 
Wu, J., and J. Yu. 2017. “Efficiency-Equity Tradeoffs in Targeting Payments for Ecosystem 
Services.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 99(4):894–913. 
Zabel, A. 2019. “Biodiversity-Based Payments on Swiss Alpine Pastures.” Land Use Policy 
81:153–59. 
Zabel, A., G. Bostedt, and H. Ekvall. 2018. “Policies for Forest Landscape Management – 
A Conceptual Approach with an Empirical Application for Swedish Conditions.” 
Forest Policy and Economics 86:13–21. 
Zavalloni, Matteo, Meri Raggi, and Davide Viaggi. 2019. “Agri-Environmental Policies and 
Public Goods: An Assessment of Coalition Incentives and Minimum Participation 
Rules.” Environmental and Resource Economics 72(4):1023–40. 
              
 
61 
This project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement GA 817949 
 
 
9 Annex 1 – Preferences for different contract attributes based on stated preference 
 
 REFERENCE & SUMMARY ATTRIBUTE DESCRIPTION ATTRIBUTE LEVELS 
(X, Y) 
RESULTS OF STUDY 
1. (Eric Ruto and Garrod, 
2009) 
1. Minimum length of agreement 
(years): Duration of AES contract 
 
2. Flexibility over what areas of the 
farm are entered into the scheme: 
whether or not the scheme allows 
flexibility over which areas of the 
farm are entered into the scheme 
 
3. Flexibility over undertaking some 
of the measures required under 
the scheme: whether or not the 
scheme allows flexibility over 
adherence to scheme 
prescriptions 
 
4. Average time spent on 
paperwork/ administration: levels 
of administration as measured by 















Low (1-2 h), Medium 
(2-5 h), High (> 5 h) 
 
 
- Farmers prefer  
 shorter contract lengths  
 greater  flexibility over what  areas 
of  the  farm  are  entered  into  the 
scheme 
 greater  flexibility  over  scheme 




- farmers require greater financial 
incentives to join schemes if they 
do not meet the above 
requirements 
 
- Existing scheme participants were 
found to be more ‘low-resistance 
adopter’ segment than the 
contrasting ‘high-resistance 
adopter’ segment 
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the amount of time spent on non-
operational aspects of the 
scheme, such as on paperwork 
and information gathering 
 
 5. Additional payment per ha: the 
per hectare payment rate made 







5%, 10%, 20% 
 
 Low resistance adopters tend to be 
better  educated,  younger,  with 
larger  farm  holdings  and  have 
more  positive  attitudes  to  the 
environment. Thus, more  likely  to 
join schemes. 
 High  resistance  adopters  were 
more  likely  to  be  tenant  farmers 
and to rely of the farm business for 
a  greater  proportion  of  their 
household incomes 
 
- to ensure better participation in a 
more restrictive scheme, higher 
incentives could be made 
available in areas with ‘high-
resistance adopters’ population  
 
- Less generous incentives may 
achieve desired participation levels 
if less restrictive scheme parameters 
are adopted or in areas where 
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2. (Espinosa-Goded, 




1. Flexibility over the amount of 
land to be enrolled in the AES 
 





3. Availability of a compulsory and 
free of charge technical training 
and advisory service 
 
4. Availability of a 1000 € one-off 
payment per contract 
independently of the area 
enrolled payable on the first year 
 
5. Payment level per ha and year 




(limitations could be 












60, 80, 100, 120 
(€/ha/year) 
- farmers are willing to participate 
for lower compensation in 
programmes that allow the 
maintenance of agricultural activity 
(i.e. grazing in enrolled surface) and 
do not impose stringent restrictions 
on farm management (i.e. 
enrolment of at least 50% of eligible 
land).  
 
- Higher payments could be offered 
to induce farmers to participate 
 
- Substantial savings can be 
obtained by including a fixed 
component per contract in the AES 
premium 
 
- Provision of compulsory technical 
assistance and monitoring can also 
be used to reduce the premiums 
necessary to secure participation 
 
- as long as the main environmental 
objectives are met, relaxing the 
grazing restriction could lead to 
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significant increase in farmer up-
take at lower budgetary costs as 
farmers would be willing to 
participate for less compensation  
 
- including a fixed component in 
the compensation premium could 
reduce overall contract costs 
 
- More flexibility in AES 
management prescriptions is 










1. Area size: the share (%) of the 
eligible area of the property under 
contract 
 
2. Cattle density: the number of 
livestock units allowed per hectare 
of forage area on the farm 
 
3. Tree density: the number of cork 
and holm oak trees per hectare on 
the contracted land by the end of 
the contract period  
 













- results show that the minimum 
willingness to accept financial 
compensation for current 
contractual agreements and their 
terms and conditions is higher by a 
factor of six than actual pay-out 
levels 
 
- Also points at the low financial 
incentives and the lack of 
information among farmers as the 
              
 
65 
This project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement GA 817949 
 
 
4. Contract duration: the lifetime of 
the contract (years), 
corresponding to the period during 
which the farmer must comply with 
the contract terms and conditions 
 
5. Compensation: the 
compensation in euros per 
hectare per year to manage and 
maintain the land according to 
the contract specification over the 
contract lifetime 
 






100, 250, 450 
(€/ha/year) 
 
main reasons why they do not 
participate in the program  
 
- Cattle density, tree density, 
contract length and financial 
compensation all have a significant 
impact on choice behaviour 
 
- Contract characteristics like cattle 
density and contract length are 
more important for farmers' 
decision to participate when 
compared to tree density or area 
size.  
 
- most important factor influencing 
farmers' participation in future AEAs 
is compensation of their opportunity 
costs, followed by technical 
support.  
 
- 82% of the farmers consider the 
ecological effectiveness of the 
scheme important when deciding 
to participate or not. 
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- Farmers prefer higher cattle 
density and lower tree density rates. 
They also prefer short-term 
contracts 
 
- There exists a clear trade-off 
between willingness to accept 
financial compensation and 
farmers' opportunity costs 
measured through varying cattle 
and oak trees density levels.  
 
*Robustness of the CE: 
- careful survey design 
- information should be policy 
relevant so it can be used in 
instrument design 
- CE was thoroughly pre-tested 
- CE preceded by a small-scale 
farm household survey and in-
depth consultation of stakeholders 
for identifying relevant contract 
characteristics and their levels 
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(Wainwright et al., 2019)  
 
1. Contract Length (in years) 
 















4. Subsidy  




2 Levels:  
- Basic application 
assistance 
- Additional advisory 














90, 270, 530, 890 
(Lei/year) 
 
- Ovines  
5, 15, 25, 45 (Lei/year) 
 
Contract Preferences: 
- farmers demonstrated a clear 
willingness to participate in 
conservation programmes for rare 
breeds 
 
- Participation may be reduced by 
up to 84% if farmer preferences for 
non-financial attributes are not 
taken into consideration 
 
- Farmers demonstrated a 
preference for shorter contract 
durations (a common finding in 
other studies) 
 
- While bovine farmers preferred 
individually managed conservation 
programmes ovine farmers 
preferred community managed 
schemes 
 
- However, farmers enrolled in AES 
schemes were more likely not to 
select a contract option, 
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*monetary attribute in 
local currency (Lei per 
year) was based on a 
percentage (10%, 
30%, 60% and 100%) 
of the proposed 
monetary reward 
outlined in the RDP; 
the premise being 
that some farmers 
may be willing to 
accept (WTA) a lower 
reward, depending 
on contract design 
suggesting overlap with existing 
contractual schemes may deter 
farmers from participating 
 
Contract participation:  
- Estimates reveal a trade-off 
between nonmonetary attributes 
and financial incentives 
 
- Contrary to expectations, farm 
size, education level and age did 
not have a significant effect on 
participation 
 
Barriers to uptake: 
- clear barriers to entry for 
smallholder farmers wishing to 
participate in incentive schemes 
-EU rural development policy is not 
clearly communicated. In this study, 
only 21% of farmers were aware of 
RDP funding support for farmers 
rearing endangered breeds 
 
Payment Results: 
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- Average bovine farmer needs to 
be paid €122 per annum per 
animal extra in order to enrol in a 
10-year community managed 
conservation contract.  
- For ovines, an additional incentive 
price of €8.3 would be required for 
farmers to enrol in a 10-year 









1. Agricultural diversification: 




2. Use of chemicals: to reduce 
chemical use on arable farms by x 
% 
 
3. Length of agreement:  no. of 
years 
 
4. Compensation: annual 








25%, 50%, 75%, 100%  
 
 
1, 2, 5, 10 
 
500, 1000, 2500, 5000, 
7500, 10,000 
 
- respondents show reluctance to 
adopt higher reduction in chemical 
use while they show a preference 
towards adoption of drought 
tolerant crops over agroforestry 
 
- farmers with larger household size 
show aversion to reduction of 
chemicals and prefer to adopt 
agroforestry. Similarly, farmers with 
higher number of labourers also 
show a preference towards 
agroforestry 
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- Interaction of agricultural income 
with contract length reveals a 
preference towards shorter 
contracts 
 
- farmers with more agricultural 
experience require lower 
compensations 
 
- farmers are more likely to 
participate when a scheme offers 
higher compensations when other 




(Villanueva et al., 2017) 
 
1. Cover crops area: percentage 
of the olive grove area covered 
by cover crops 
 
2. Cover crops management: 
















*former implies no 
restrictions other than 
those that are part of 
cross-compliance, 
 
- Cover crops area: farm 
management and farmer 
knowledge and perceptions of AES 
are found to influence their WTA. 
Results observed harvesting of 
ground olives increased and 
previous participation in AES 
decreased the farmers’ WTA for 
cover crops area 
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3. Ecological focus areas (EFA): 
percentage of the olive grove 





4. Collective participation: 
participation of a group of farmers 
(at least 5) with farms located in 










while the latter 
restricts the use of 
both tillage and 
herbicide in cover 
crops management 
 
 0%, 2% 
 
*considering green 









can help in reducing 
transaction costs 
(mainly public) while 
increasing the 
environmental 
effectiveness of policy 
instruments 
 
- Cover crops management: farmer 
characteristics and perceptions are 
determinants of their preferences.  
 farmers who perceive cover crops 
as  a  profitable  farming  practice 
would  have  fewer  objections  to 
restricting  their  cover  crops 
management options 
 
- Ecological Focus areas: farmers’ 
preferences towards ecological 
focus areas is influenced by a 
variety of factors.  
 not having undergone agricultural 
professional training increases the 
WTA  for  both  extensive  and 
intensive sub‐systems 
 higher  the  farmer  perception  of 
EFA  being  environmentally 
beneficial,  lower  is  the  WTA  for 
mountainous groves 
 
- Collective Participation: farm and 
farmer characteristics and farmer 
perceptions play a role in farmers’ 
preferences towards collective 
participation  
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5. Monitoring: percentage of farms 







6. Payment: yearly payment per 




*studies have shown 





100€, 200€, 300€ and 




willingness  to  participate  in 
collective AES 
 farmers  over  the  age  of  60  years 
show  a  higher WTA  for  collective 
participation than younger ones (in 
plain  irrigated  and  plain  rain‐fed 
olive groves) 
 when  farmer  perceive  that  there 
will be no farm takeover, they are 
more willing  to  participate  in  AES 
collectively  and  their  WTA  is 
reduced 
 
- Monitoring: this attribute 
influences farmers’ WTA only in rain-
fed plain groves as them having a 
greater fear of heightened levels of 
monitoring 
 
- Overall Results indicate that 
mountainous grove farmers would 
participate in AES schemes, both 
individually and collectively, in 
return for a lower payment than 
farmers of plain rain-fed or irrigated 
groves. Farmers of plain rain-fed 
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groves would take highest 









1. Location of trees: location of 
trees along the border of the farm 
of a neighboring participant 
 
2. Share of farm: percentage of 
farm dedicated to the measure 
 
3. Recommendation: whether the 
program has been selected over 






4. Payment for action: annual 
individual payment in € per 
hectare, in addition to the 
reimbursement of planting costs 















- No particular 
recommendation 
 
50, 100, 150, 200 
(€/ha/year) 
 
- For the preference in location of 
the trees, 63% Spanish, 60% 
Germans, and 74% Swiss 
participants at the Spanish, 
German and Swiss sites preferred to 
concentrate them in one plot than 
to spread them out in different plots 
 
- results support the current 
knowledge about the opportunity 
costs of devoting agricultural 
resources (i.e., land) to 
conservation in landscapes with 
intensified agricultural production 
and the eagerness of farmers to 
avoid or minimize costs 
 
- Most of the farmers (>70%) at all 3 
sites perceived that most of the 
farmers in their county would not 
be interested in the tree planting 
measure, and neither in obtaining 
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the consent of their neighbors and 
hence, planting trees in the border 
of their farms would not be easy 
 
- Only at Swiss sites, the attribute of 
‘farmer recommendation’ had a 
significant positive impact as 
compared to the absence of any 
recommendation in particular. In 
contrast, the attribute ‘scientist 
recommendation’ had no 
significant impact at any of the 
sampling sites 
 
- the farmers prefer the ecosystem 
services with a higher share of 
private to public benefits. Thus, soil 
conservation, and maybe also, 
biodiversity, are expected to 
contribute more to farm 
productivity and farmer’s benefits 
than water conservation, which 
mostly benefits downstream users. 
This shows that the willingness of 
farmers to participate in 
conservation programs varied 
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depending on the goals of 
conservation. 
 
- the ‘payment’ attribute had a 
positive and significant impact on 
utility across all countries.  
 
- around 37% of all farmers 






(De Salvo et al., 2018) 
 















- Turfing sloping 
surfaces 
- Construction of 
temporary furrow sinks 






- Grazing stubble, 
straw, and crop 
residue 
 
- Majority of farmers were aware on 
the rules of eco-conditionality 
locally in force, and positively 
welcomed the opportunity to 
exercise more restrictive eco-
friendly agricultural practices 
 
- farmers stated positive preference 
towards the maintenance of soil 
fertility and the control of the risk of 
soil erosion.  
 
- In particular, turfing sloping 
surfaces was preferred to furrows-
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4. Agro-biodiversity conservation 
(%) 
 
5. Additional compensation (€/ha) 
- Creation of 
firebreaks and burying 
of crop residues 








75%, 50%, 25%, 0% 
 





sinks. Among furrows sinks, farmers 
declared to prefer more closed 
sinks.  
 
- For practices aimed at protecting 
soil fertility, grazing stubble was 
considered the most appropriate 
respect to firebreaks, burying and 
burning crop residues.  
 
- Practices to protect soil from 
water erosion and to maintain its 
fertility influenced positively the 
choice among alternative AES.  
 
- Farmers perceived negatively the 
maintenance of countryside 
landscape elements, and the 
cultivation of old local varieties of 
grains.  
 
- Estimates revealed also that 
farmers’ preferences were 
heterogeneous respect to the 
protection of soil from water 
erosion, the maintenance of soil 
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organic matter, and the cultivation 
of local endangered varieties. 
 
- Spatial econometric analysis 
revealed the existence of a 
“neighbor effect” influencing 
farmers’ preferences for the 
cultivation of endangered varieties.  
 
- It suggests that in design of AES, 
policy makers should account that 
famer’s preferences vary among 
practices but also among local 
contexts. Focus on local context 
might improve the acceptability of 










1. Annual economic subsidy per 
hectare SEK Arable land (other 
land use) (SEK/ha/year) 
 
 
2. Time frame for subsidy and 
commitment: Min years of 
 





Current level:  
5 (20) 
 
- Landowners were 3.5 times more 
willing to create a new wetland 
than were the leaseholders since a 
long-term and costly commitment 
such as wetland creation (up to 20 
years) could be difficult and risky for 
a leaseholder.  
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commitment (max extension of 
commitment in years) 
 










4. Economic compensation for 











Current level:  
No practical 
assistance for 




forum, and practical 
assistance with 
projecting and 
designing a wetland 
 
Current level:  











- younger farmers were more likely 
to be willing to create a wetland 
than older ones 
 
- the organic farming and farmers 
that were already applying 
environmental measures did not 
show an increased willingness to 
create wetlands as compared to 
conventional farmers. 
 
- analysing the results from the 
choice experiment, the level and 
composition of financial support 
was found to be the most important 
attributes for farmers' willingness to 
participate.  
 
- According to the CE, an increase 
of the economic compensation to 
100% for wetland construction 
costs, within the current cost ceiling, 
was the most important factor to 
increase the willingness to create 
wetlands. The second most 
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important factors were an increase 
of the cost ceiling for the 
compensation, and an increase of 
the yearly subsidy level.  
 
- Hence, an increase in financial 
support could be a partial solution 
to attract more farmers.  
 
- Nevertheless, approximately 70% 
of the respondents were not willing 
to create wetlands on their land.  
 
- One of the major reasons given by 
the respondents for not 
participating in wetland creation 
schemes was high costs.  
 
- Thus result-oriented schemes can 
be more motivating by 
encouraging farmers to innovate to 
allow for their farm to deliver 
ecosystem services. 
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1. Conservation requirement: 
expresses the environmental 
service to be remunerated. Focus 
is on broad-scale biodiversity 
conservation by removing cattle 
from the contract area either 
completely for the duration of the 
contract period or temporarily (i.e. 
‘spelling’ the contract area every 
year) during times when 
biodiversity is particularly sensitive 
to grazing. Defined relative to 
cattle grazing and associated 
opportunity cost 
 
2. Annual conservation payment: 
The contract stipulates and annual 
per hectare conservation 
payment (in $/ha/year) 
 
3. Contract length 
 





- Short spelling  
- Long spelling  












1, 2, 4, 8, 16, 32 
($/ha/year 
 
5, 10, 20, 40 years 
 




- Results show that pastoralists and 
graziers require a greater monetary 
incentive to sign up to longer 
contract periods or alternatives 
causing higher opportunity costs, 
and they prefer flexibility 
 
- the principal factors explaining 
participation choice across the 
northern pastoral industry are the 
contract attributes, especially the 
conservation requirement and level 
of stewardship payment offered. 
 
- Across the industry, participation is 
distinctly positively influenced by 
favourable attitudes towards 
biodiversity and towards PES. This 
finding highlights the importance of 
complementing new PES-style 
programs with education and 
extension 
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5. Monitoring (conducted by) 
  
- Introducing some level of contract 






(Vedel, Jacobsen, and 
Thorsen, 2015) 
 
1. Purpose of afforestation: 
different levels used in this attribute 
have different significance. 
Biodiversity implies that the 
afforested area mainly consists of 
broadleaved trees. Ground water 
protection implies that the ground 
preparation is minimal and no 
pesticides/herbicides can be used, 
and recreation implies that there 
has to be established walking 
paths and parking areas 
 
2. Option of cancelling the 
contract: The contract is either 
binding or may be cancelled 
within 5 or 10 years. If the contract 
is cancelled, the compensation 
has to be paid back to the state 
(with a specified interest rate) and 
 
3 levels:  
- Biodiversity  










- Option of cancelling 
within 10 years 
- Option of cancelling 
within 5 years  




1%, 10%, 25% 
 
- 7% and 63% of the landowners 
hold social preferences for 




- For the large subgroup consisting 
of 63%, the combined effect of 
monitoring and the interaction term 
on WTA varies from e.g. €194 in 
required additional compensation 
for a contract with 1% monitoring 
and the lowest subsidy level to a 
reduction in WTA of €1263 for a 
contract with 25% monitoring and 
the highest subsidy level. 
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the landowner is then free to return 
the area to arable land 
 
3. Monitoring: A fraction of the 
landowners who accept a 
contract will receive a visit by the 
authorities in order to check 
landowners’ commitment (%) 
(Monitoring, 0% is reference) 
 
4. Compensation: The 
compensation is the amount the 
landowner receives as a one-time 







€3620–5525 per ha  




(Lienhoop and Brouwer, 
2015) 
 
1.  Forest size (%): size of the 
afforestation area expressed as 
percentage of farmland 
 
2. Forest type: Commercial 
production forest with one or two 
species (the revenues of which 
stay with the farmer) vs. a non-
commercial mixed forest 
containing a greater diversity of 
 












- Although only 50% of farmers 
regard afforestation as an 
important countryside issue, CE 
reveals that majority of farmers 
(67%) are willing to trade-off the 
offered afforestation contract 
design features against the subsidy 
level  
 
- The questionnaire analysis reveals 
that farmers require the subsidy 
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plants and wild animals and 
generating less revenue 
 
3. Technical advice: availability of 
technical advice by rangers to 
plant and manage the forest 
throughout the duration of the 
contract 
 
4. Recreational access: allowing 
public recreational access 
(expenses for setting-up walking 
paths and benches will be 
covered by the contract) 
 
5. Return to agriculture at end of 
contract 
 
6. Contract length (years) 
 
7. Subsidy: financial compensation 
in the form of subsidies per year 
and hectare to compensate for 


















10, 25, 50 years 
 
500, 750, 1000, 1500, 
2000, 3000 
(€/ha/year) 
level to be as lucrative as their 
current land uses (i.e. they should 
cover the opportunity costs of 
afforestation) 
 
- Analysis of forest size attribute 
suggest that farmers have a strong 
disutility for large forests.  
 
- Large-scale afforestation projects 
are not attractive, farmers would 
require considerable subsidy 
payments, and hence their 
implementation could only be 
achieved at a very high cost. 
 
- regarding other attributes, study 
observed that farmers prefer shorter 
to longer contracts and have a 
strong preference for the option to 
return to agriculture after the 
contract ends 
 
- 74% farmers preferred flexibility in 
their contract duration and 
considered the opportunity to 
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terminate the contract at any time 
to be an important precondition 
 
- If offered technical advice, 
farmers would accept lower levels 
of subsidies for planting and 
managing the forest, since the 
majority of farmers have no 
experience with forestry 
 
- Species’ diversity (provided 
through non-commercial forests), 
timber production (provided 
through commercial forests) and 
recreation do not play a significant 






(Christensen et al., 2011)  
 
1. Contract length 
 










*Yes: Can be released 
from contract without 
costs once a year 
 
- CE results show that there is a 
great deal of uncertainty among 
farmers concerning the 
consequences of enrolling in 
subsidy schemes with respect to the 
degree of overlap with other 
subsidy schemes, and the extent to 
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- Between 6 and 24 m  
- 6 m 
 
2 levels: 
– Fertilizer can be 
used in buffer zones 
– Pesticides or artificial 
manure cannot be 
used in buffer zone  
 
2 levels: 
– Assistance free of 
charge from 
extension service to 
send in application 
form 
– Application for 
subsidy on common 
application form 
 
134, 228, 336, 510 
(Euro/ha/year) 
 
which cross compliance might be 
put into force.  
 
- Study also found a considerable 
lack of trust in authorities among 
farmers. 
 
- CE shows that the vast majority of 
farmers (86%) are willing to trade off 
scheme requirements against the 
size of the subsidy.  
 
- Results also show farmers can pay 
in monetary terms for being 
released of administrative burden. 
Thus, they are willing to accept a 
lower payment in exchange for 
free assistance for enrolling in a 
scheme 
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(Kuhfuss et al., 2015) 
 
1. Herbicides used on the farm 
during the contract: Global 
reduction of herbicide use on the 
enrolled area (in proportion of 
present use) (%) 
 
2. Localized use of herbicides: 
Supplementary localized use of 
herbicides beyond the committed 
reduction 
 
3. Collective and final conditional 
bonus: 150€/ha after five years, 
provided that, at the end of the 5 
years, 50% of the area of interest is 
engaged in a process of herbicide 
use reduction 
 
4. Administrative and technical 
assistance: Free administrative and 
technical assistance included in 














Final bonus (150€/ha 














- CE results show that the 
introduction of a collective 
dimension to agri-environmental 
contracts could effectively 
enhance efficiency of AES in three 
ways with winegrowers:  
1. it  would  enhance  farmers’  initial 




for  a  contract  can  be  lowered  by 
this  amount  if  a  relatively  small 
bonus  is  included.  So,  even  if  a 
bonus  has  to  be  paid  to  each 
farmer who has  signed a  contract 
(because  the  threshold  has  been 
reached),  the  cost  of  the  scheme 
per hectare is reduced 
3. Study  found  that  the  collective 
bonus does encourage the farmers 
to  enrol  a  larger  share  of  their 
vineyard in the scheme 
 
- study also reports that farmers are 
more willing to make environmental 
efforts when their neighbours do so 
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5. Individual annual payment per 
enrolled hectare  






- In conclusion, contracts with the 
conditional bonus incite the 













2. First mowing not before 
 





4. Contract period 
 
5. Annual compensation  
 
3 levels: 
- organic and mineral 
allowed 
- organic permitted  
- no fertilisation 
allowed 
 
1 June, 22 June 
 
2, 3, 4 animals per 
hectare  
(1 animal = 1 cattle or 
3 sheeps) 
 
1, 5, 10 years 
 
250, 350, 450  
€ per hectare per 
year 
 
- This paper demonstrates:  
1. how  2‐stage  analysis  of 
discrete–continuous 
supply, based on CE, can 
be  used  to  inform  the 
design  of  conservation 
contracts  





- The results of 2-stage analysis 
showed that it is possible to 
determine  
1. the probability of whether  farmer 
participates  in  an  agri‐
environmental scheme  
2. land  area  he  would  be  willing  to 
enrol in such a scheme.  
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- Stricter prescriptions led to a fall in 
the probability of choosing a 
contract, while a higher 
compensation payment per 
hectare increased it. The greatest 
effects were on fertilisation, grazing 
and mowing prescriptions. 
 
- Farm-specific variables also had a 
significant influence on contract 
choice. Farmers who already 
participated in agri-environmental 
schemes (dummy variable ‘scheme 
participant’) were more likely to opt 









1. Area: The area enrolled in the 
contract (%) 
 
2. Length of contract 
 
3. Termination: Flexibility to 




1, 5, 7, 10, 15, 25, 100 
(%) 
 
1, 3, 5, 7, 10, 20 (years) 
 
Not possible,  




- WTA differs substantially between 
countries 
 
- subsidy is negatively correlated to 
the ‘Area enrolled’ attribute. 
 
- Similarly, lengthier contracts would 
require higher subsidies 
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4. Advisory: Advice offered 
 
5. Payment levels: EUR/ha 
dependent on the country  
(in the choice cards the subsidy 








DK 9 levels: from 70 to 
940 EUR/ha (500–7000 
DKK/ha)  
 
EE 10 levels: 
from 50 to 1000 
EUR/ha  
 
FI 10 levels: from 50 to 
500 EUR/ha 
 
PL 10 levels: from 23 to 
345 EUR/ha (100–2000 
PLN/ha)  
 
SE 10 levels: from 25 to 
570 EUR/ha (250–6000 
SEK/ha) 
 
- Results also show that the effect of 
the option for the farmer to 
terminate a contract varies across 
the countries.  
 
- Finally, contracts containing the 
possibility of free agricultural advice 
were valued at 131 EUR per ha in 
Estonia, 33 EUR in Sweden, 28 EUR in 
Denmark and 18 EUR in Poland. This 
also depends on whether the 
countries have pre-existing advisory 









1. Specifications: Levels of 
specifications required by the 
compensatory measurement 
 
- Level I: 30 UN, June 
20, no refuge area 
 
 
- Farmers prefer to keep their 
current practices and, if they 
commit, prefer contracts with 
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contract with regard to: the 
quantity of nitrogen for fertilization 
(UN), the mowing delay and the 







2. Duration of engagement: Total 
commitment period of the 
compensatory measure contract 
 
3. Conditional monetary bonus: 
Additional remuneration (200 
€/ha/year) for additional 
ecological measures when the 
bonus is proposed in the scenario 
 
 
4. Remuneration of the measure: 
Remuneration received each year 
by the farmer per hectare hired 
(€ / ha / year) 
 
- Level II: 0 UN, June 
20, no refuge area 
 
- Level III: 0 UN, July 
20, no refuge area 
 
- Level IV: 0 UN, July 








Bonus available (200 
€/ha/y), No bonus in 
compensatory 
measure, No bonus 
because it was the 
opt-out option that 
was chosen 
 
800, 1100, 1500, 2000  
(€ / ha / year) 
 
limited management constraints, of 
short duration, with a conditional 
monetary bonus and well 
remunerated, which seems quite 
intuitive.  
 
- Two interactions between attributes 
and socioeconomic variables have 
significant effects:  
1. having larger areas increases the 
probability of adopting more 
restrictive measures 
2. being the owner of his land, 
whether partially or completely, 
increases the probability of signing a 
contract, and this, for a longer 
period.  
 
- Among the farmers with larger 
holdings and more often owners, 
there are two profiles represented 
by classes 2 and 3.  
 
- Members of class 2 are not 
against the idea of engaging in 
MC.   
              
 
91 
This project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement GA 817949 
 
5. Non- participation: Farmer 







measure A or B 
 
 
- Class 3 farmers are the only ones 
with a strong preference to keep 
their current practices. If they had 
to accept MCs, which 64% find 
realistic, these should include 
limited constraints, of short duration, 
contain a monetary bonus and be 
well remunerated (ie results similar 
to the mixed Logit model).  
 
- Finally, class 2 and 3 farmers 
based their choices essentially on 
the duration of 
engagement attribute (91% and 
70% respectively), which translates 























- On an average farmers are more 
likely to choose a conservation 
contract than a compensation 
contract. 
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2. Threshold: Existence of a 
minimum threshold of participation 
of 20% of farmers of the area 
 
3. Payment: Payment level per ha 
and year 
 






170, 200, 230, 260 
(€/ha) 
 
Opt-out, Contract 1 or 
Contract 2 
- Farmers prefer contracts which 
are not conditional to a minimum 
participation level. They would 
require 59€ more to enroll in a 
contract that includes a 20% 
threshold of participation rather 
than in a contract that does not 
include a threshold. This difference 
might be linked to anticipated 
costs of transaction. 
 
- Farmers are reluctant to engage 
into a contract procedure (which 
can be costly in terms of 
paperwork, compulsory meetings 
with extension workers etc.) which 
may not be finalized. Revealing the 
existence of such threshold might 
therefore be counterproductive for 
the developer because it will 
discourage some farmers to 
participate in the contracts. 
 
- There is also a significant 
preference for the opt-out option, 
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i.e. the non-participation in any of 









1. Nature: conversion of 
agricultural areas to pasture, using 
particular species with a high 
natural value  
 
2. Biodiversity improvement: 
growing of hedges with species 
suitable for insect development.  
 
3. Landscape improvement: 
building of fences for animals at 
pasture.  
 
4. Seeds: use of native seeds.  
 
 
5. Lisciviation: additional decrease 
of 5% in nitrates consumption with 




No surface, 1/3 
surface, 1/2 surface 
 
 
Do not make it, 
Creation of hedges 
 
 
Do not make it, 
Creation of fences 
 
No surface, 1/2 
surface, All the 
surface 
 
No surface, 1/2 







- results indicate three different 
groups of farmers, each with 
specific preferences regarding the 
environmental measures to be 
applied 
 
- Farmers in Class I (the largest) are 
interested only in intensification of 
the reduction of nitrates and not in 
AES. It seems that farmers in Class I 
are willing to accept payment for 
increasing a current mandatory 
environmental measure. 
Furthermore, they are not interested 
or are unfavourable to more 
innovative actions, such as the 
growing of hedges and 
naturalization 
 
- Class II farmers, the smallest 
(15.76%), showed opposite results 
compared to Class I  
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6. Money: additional annual 









- Class II is that of the youngest 
farmers and have higher willingness 
to participate in AES 
 
- The majority of farmers would 
prefer to practice traditional 
agricultural methods that are 
already in use with a low intensity in 





(Chang et al., 2017) 
 




2. Payment for entry to the 
scheme (reference level): Fixed 




3. Additional chemical fertilizer 
reduction with corresponding 
reward payments (NT$/ha/year) 
 
 
25% eligible area, 50% 
eligible area, 100% 
eligible area 
 






- only comply with 
reference level (no 
payment) 
 
- results suggest that to encourage 
full enrolment (100%) of their 
farmland, offered compensation 
must perhaps lie over NTD$ 698 per 
hectare (for farmers estimated to 
be willing to participate) 
 
- the option of extending the 
contract length to 5 years requires 
additional compensation 
(approximately NTD$ 404 per 
hectare) 
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4. Contract length: Duration of the 
contract 
 
5. Eco-Label: An eco-label for 
farmers who successfully comply 
with the standard 
 
- apply 15% less than 
reference level (NT$ 
1000) 
- apply 30% less than 
reference level (NT$ 
2000) 
- give up the use of 
chemical fertilizer (NT$ 
5000) 
 




- However, when the eco-label is 
provided to the farmers in 
exchange for participating in the 
CFRS, they are willing to accept a 
significantly lower compensation 
level (about NTD$ 717 less) 
 
- Model analysis separates the 
farmers into 2 classes 
 
- Class 1 is the group of respondents 
having less education and not 
having a history of actively 
practicing rational fertilization. It is 
very unlikely that this group can be 
motivated to participate in the 
scheme.  
 
- Class 2 group has higher 
education and has already 
obtained at least one of the 
certifications for their products. This 
group also follows an extension 
agent’s advice while decreasing 
the amount of fertilizer use 
gradually. They currently use 100% 
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chemical fertilizer on the farm. This 
group appreciates having an eco-
label and has a positive attitude 
towards additional payment. 
However, they are not willing to 
practice further fertilizer reduction. 
This may show that the farmers’ 
attitude of aversion to further 
chemical fertilizer reduction means 








1. Green roof surface: Percentage 
of the surface of mountain olive 
grove under cover vegetable (%) 
 




3. Insecticide treatment: made in 
the plots of mountain olive grove 
 
 
4. Premium for results: single 
payment at the end from the agri-
environment program to condition 
 
10% (reference level), 
30%, 50%, 100%  
 
 
Free (reference level), 
Limited, Brushcutter 
and/or tooth, No 
driving 
 







- results show that at a higher level 
of demand the DAA of farmers 
increases, positively correlating 
attribute value increase.  
 
- Beyond a certain point of 
demand, majority of the farmers 
are not willing to accept the 
adoption of associated practices. 
 
- there are programs with low 
requirements (e.g., related to 
integrated production) for which 
farmers would require modest 
compensation (< 80 €/ha), other 
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that they be at provision levels of 
biodiversity and functionality of 
expected ground 
 
5. Annual payment: per hectare to 




level), Inclusion of 
premium for €400/ha 
to be received in the 
5th year of the 
program 
 
50, 150, 250, 350 
programs with demanding 
requirements (ecological) for which 
they require moderate 
compensation (125-175 €/ha), while 
for programs with very high levels of 
demand (which greatly limit the 
management of farm) significant 





(Pröbstl-Haider et al., 
2016) 
  
- Almost all farmers participated in 
AES (99.3%) 
 
- About 2/3rd of the respondents 
(65.5%) had already signed 
conservation-related contracts in 
past, and 22% of them contributed 
to the conservation of wet 
meadows in the March–Thaya 
floodplains 
 
- About half of all respondents (48 
%) indicated that they would be 
willing to participate in AES 
contracts again upon expiry of their 
current contracts 
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1. Type of 
management 
2. Gross margin 
(€/ha/year) 
3. Environment 
premium per ha 
per year (AES) 
4. Duration 
(years) 
5. Potential price 
fluctuation 













150, 375, 550, 
725 












€ 300, 600, 
900, 1200 






















- Another 30 % of all farmers were 
undecided and 22 % would not sign 
new contracts.  
 
- Their main reasons for opposing 
these contracts were 
 inadequate compensation (10%) 




- Regarding farmers’ perception of 
climate change  
 Overall,  the  majority  of  farmers 
(64.2 %) already “recognize the first 
effects  of  human  induced  climate 
change,”  
 7.5  %  expect  to  see  “significant 
effects in the near future.” 
 Another  25  %  are  “undecided  if 
climate change will occur,”  
 2  %  “do  not  believe  in  climate 
change 
 
- Regarding farmers’ perception of 
future farm development, the 
majority of respondents planned to 
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expand their farm, intensify farming 
or specialize in a particular crop. 
Options like reducing the amount 
of acreage, changing to a different 
management model (i.e., 
conventional vs. organic farming), 
or terminating the business were the 




(Hope, Borgoyary, and 
Agarwal, 2008) 
 
1. Land commitment to organic 
farming (acres) (%) 
 
2. organic crop price increase (per 
100 Rupees) 
 








5. labour days to compost one 
trolley 
 
25%, 50%, 75%, 100% 
 
 
5, 7, 9, 11, 13, 15 
 
 
R1,000 as a group, 
R3,000 as a group, 
R3,000 as an 
individual 
 
R600, R900, R1200, 
R1500 
 
4, 8, 12, 16 
 
- Results from choice experiment 
estimates farmer preferences with 
regard to a range of scenarios, and 
reveals two groups of farmers with 
differing choice profiles and 
sociodemographic characteristics 
from a latent class analysis.  
 
- Class 2 farmers express a positive 
preference for adopting organic 
farming subject to price incentives 
and labour constraints 
 
- In Class 1, the attributes for labour 
effort and compost price are not 
significant. This indicates a higher 
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price preference for Class 2 
farmers.  
 
- While Class 2 farmers are more 
willing to convert land to organic 
production, this is balanced by a 
higher price preference and a 
lower labour investment.  
 
- Class 1 farmers record high 
positive utility estimates for 
certifying land across the three 
scenarios, price per acre has little 
impact on utility levels. In contrast, 
Class 2 farmers record an almost 
identical utility estimate to the 
aggregate score for group 
certification at R1000 per acre, but 
they reveal a far larger utility 
improvement from this option in 
comparison with the higher-cost 
certification options. 
 
- Class 1 farmers have no 
experience of organic farming, are 
over 50, and live in the upper 
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watershed, compared with Class 2 
farmers, who do have organic 
experience, are illiterate, are non-
income poor, and live in the lower 
watershed.  
 
- Finally, land commitment attribute 
suggests that Class 1 farmers are 
literate and live in non-poor homes. 
In contrast, Class 2 farmers are 








Limón, 2019)  
 
1. Cover crops area: percentage 
of the olive grove area covered 
by cover crops 
 
2. Cover crops management: 
















*former implies no 
restrictions other than 
those that are part of 
cross-compliance, 
 
- Payment is the attribute with the 
lowest level of nonattendance; 
thus, showing it is most important for 
farmers 
 
- Monitoring is the attribute with the 
highest level of nonattendance.  
- Thus, it received the least 
attention from the farmers, 
indicating that monitoring played a 
minor role in farmers choices 
 
- The attributes for collective 
participation and ecological focus 
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3. Ecological focus areas (EFA): 
percentage of the olive grove 





4. Collective participation: 
participation of a group of farmers 












while the latter 
restricts the use of 
both tillage and 
herbicide in cover 
crops management 
 
 0%, 2% 
 
*considering green 









can help in reducing 
transaction costs 
(mainly public) while 
increasing the 
environmental 
effectiveness of policy 
instruments 
 
area can generate a higher 
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5. Monitoring: percentage of farms 







6. Payment: yearly payment per 




*studies have shown 





100€, 200€, 300€ and 
400€ per ha per year  
 
 
 
 
